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The Persian Gulf region is, in all likelihood, going to remain
crucial to American interests through the next several decades. The
world depends on the petroleum reserves of the Gulf region to fuel
its economic engine. The recent history of the region has been rife
with conflict, and the U.S. has had to intervene militarily on
several occasions to ensure its vital interests were protected.
This thesis examines the strategic circumstances in the Gulf region
and ways in which American political, diplomatic, and military
policy can help shape the environment to conform to its interests.
Several scenarios are developed which attempt to forecast the
results of different environments on regional stability. The thesis
reaches the conclusion that the United States must take a proactive
role if its short- and long-term interests are to be protected. The
short-term goal of U.S. policy must be to maintain a balance of
power and regional correlation of forces which serves to deter any
would-be aggressor nations. In the long run, the United States must
seek a comprehensive regional peace. Various methods of achieving
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis argues that the United States must take a
proactive role if it is to protect its vital national
interests in the Persian Gulf region over the next several
decades. Recent American efforts to maintain regional
stability, while simultaneously protecting U.S. national
interests, have tended to be reactive in nature. Only by
taking political, diplomatic, and military actions in periods
of relative peace can the United States ensure that regional
deterrence remains robust. This thesis develops several
scenarios which could possibly result due to U.S. regional
policy. The argument is put forth that the goal of U.S.
Persian Gulf policy must to shape the strategic environment.
An environment shaped by sound U.S. policy will ensure that
both the short- and long-term American strategic goals are
achievable. Coherent and coordinated U.S. regional policy has
the potential of rendering a repeat of the events of 2 August
1992 highly unlikely.
The thesis examines the recent history of the Persian Gulf
region from the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 to the post-
Desert Storm period. The United States has been involved in
the affairs of the region, in varying degrees, throughout this
period. The thesis concludes that U.S. political, diplomatic,
and military involvement will continue to be necessary if the
United States wishes to advance the twin goals of promoting
VI
regional stability and ensuring continued access to the
region's energy resources.
Chapter two examines arms proliferation trends in the Gulf
region. The nuclear weapons programs of Iran and Irag continue
to threaten the current balance of power eguation in the
region. United States policy should continue efforts at
preventing these renegade states from acguiring a nuclear
weapons capability. Various methods of accomplishing this
policy goal are examined. The problem of nuclear proliferation
has taken on an added urgency with the dissolution of the
former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The fear of
the proliferation of Russian nuclear expertise is palpable.
Additionally, the apparent willingness of communist
autocracies such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North
Korea) to supply nuclear technology to non-aligned states
further complicates efforts to control the spread of these
dangerous weapons.
In the field of conventional armaments, cash-starved
communist and former communist states are making sophisticated
weapons systems available to the highest bidder on the open
market in exchange for convertible currencies. This trend is
troubling for strategic planners the world over. Steps must be
taken to curb the sale of conventional arms as well as weapons
of mass destruction. There is a large problem, however, in
that it is unlikely that any comprehensive arms control regime
vii
can be established before the renegade nations of the Gulf,
specifically Iran and Iraq, have rearmed to a degree which
would allow them to threaten regional security. It is
therefore recommended that the United States pursue a two-
pronged approach as regards regional arms control.
The long-term approach emphasizes seeking an eventual
comprehensive multilateral arms control regime for all the
states of the Gulf region. The framework of the Conference for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is suggested as an
initial building block. Attaining this goal will require a
broad-based multilateral coalition. This coalition would
almost certainly involve years of arduous negotiations. There
are many competing interests to consider when attempting to
form a comprehensive and enduring framework for Gulf security.
Still, serious efforts to alleviate tensions in this ever
volatile region are needed immediately. Clearly this is not a
short-range solution to the problems which plague the Gulf
region
.
The short-term approach involves ensuring that the Gulf
states which are friendly to U.S. interests, specifically the
six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) , are
supplied with adequate U.S. arms to deter any would-be
aggressor nations from attempting to disrupt regional
stability by military adventure. In addition to arming our
friends in the region, the United States should seek to
strengthen military and diplomatic ties with them. The thesis
viii
postulates that a formalized collective security treaty
between the United States and the GCC states would
significantly bolster deterrence in the Gulf Region. The
thesis recommends modeling such an arrangement on the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. As a final deterrent to the
outbreak of regional warfare, the United States and GCC
nations should continue regularly scheduled series of military





The security of the Persian Gulf region is of vital
interest to the United States and its allies. This strategic
waterway and the surrounding landmass accounts for 23.3% of
world oil production. In addition, the United States relies on
the Gulf Region for 27.9% of its oil imports. 1 The security of
the flow of oil from the Gulf was certainly one of the
overriding reasons that the United States and coalition forces
acted to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991. :
In addition to the critical need to guarantee the free
passage of merchant shipping through the Persian Gulf, it is
in the United States', indeed the world's, interest to
maintain stability in this volatile region. With the demise of
the Cold War, the United States has refocused its military
strategy away from the containment of the Soviet Union and its
communist ideology. In the words of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff: "Future threats to US interests are inherent
in the uncertainty and instability of a rapidly changing
'Paul Aarts and Michael Renner, "Oil and the Gulf War,"
Middle East Report , July-August 1991, p. 26.
2In a Time article of August 20, 1990 an unnamed U.S.
official stated:
Even a dolt understands the principle, we need the oil.
It's nice to talk about standing up for freedom, but
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are not exactly democracies, and
if their principal export were oranges, a mid-level State
Department official would have issued a statement and we
would have closed Washington down for August.
world." 3 Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in the
Persian Gulf region. Over the past fifteen years the region
has experienced major wars, revolutions which have overthrown
established regimes, and numerous other crises. Most of these
crises occurred against the backdrop of East-West tensions.
Now, given the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact, instability in the region must be viewed from a
different perspective.
This thesis examines the strategic circumstances in the
Persian Gulf. Emphasis is placed on anticipating future shifts
in the strategic balance and recommending U.S. strategies that
can maintain both peace and stability as well as the unimpeded
flow of resources into and out of the region. The author
assumes that the United States will remain intimately involved
the affairs of the Persian Gulf region. A return to the
isolationism of the 1930' s is deemed highly unlikely given
continued Western reliance on petroleum and the increasingly
interdependent nature of the international economic and
political system. The United States ignores regional stability
in the Gulf at its own, and its allies, peril. The region will
continue to be vitally important to U.S. interests for the
foreseeable future. Thoughtful plans for deterring conflict
are imperative. If deterrence should fail, winning war-
fighting strategies must be in place.
^National Military Strategy of the United States , January
1992, (Washington, D.C.: GPO , 1992)
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1979 - 1992
A. THE FALL OF THE SHAH AND THE BEGINNING OF THE IRAN-IRAQ
WAR
In January 1979 the Shah of Iran's government fell and was
replaced by an Islamic fundamentalist, anti-American regime.
This development severely undermined the American position in
the Persian Gulf. The Shah had long been generally friendly to
the interests of the United States. In fact, during the 1973 -
1974 Arab oil embargo the Shah continued oil sales to the
United States. 4 The U.S. reciprocated by supplying the Shah's
regime with millions of dollars worth of military hardware.
The loss of a friendly government in Tehran, followed eleven
months later by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, motivated
a sharp response from President Carter. In his 23 January 1980
State of the Union address, Carter enunciated what later came
to be known as the "Carter Doctrine."
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of
the United States of America, and such an assault will be
4 Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm : The
United States Navy and the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.:
Naval Historical Center, 1992), p. 94. The Iranian navy
purchased oil from the Iranian National Oil Company and then
sold it to the U.S. Navy, some 1.5 million barrels that the
U.S. Navy sources considered "critical" to its operations.




In March 1980 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown outlined
the military aspects of the Carter Doctrine. American
interests in the region were announced as: "to insure access
to adequate oil supplies; to resist Soviet expansion; to
promote stability in the region; and to advance the Middle
East peace process, while insuring. . .the continued security of
the State of Israel." The Secretary further acknowledged the
primacy of Persian Gulf oil to the health and well-being of
the world economy: "The hard fact is that there is nothing the
United States—or our industrial world partners or the less
developed countries—can do in the coming decade, or probably
even the next, that would save us from severe damage if the
bulk of the oil supply from the Persian Gulf were cut off for
a sustained period." 6
In September 1980 Iraq, apparently emboldened by Iran's
loss of sponsorship by its former ally, the United States,
attacked its larger and more populous neighbor. The chaotic
political situation in Iran in the period shortly after the
Islamic revolution proved too tempting a target to Iraq's
Baathist leader Saddam Hussein. The new Iranian clerical
leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had previously listed
5Carter State of the Union Address, 23 Jan 1980, State




Saddam as one of his three enemies, along with his "infidel
Baath Party" in an interview given during his exile in France
in 197 8. '
Over half of Iraq's population (at least 55 per cent) are
followers of Shiaism, the Islamic sect predominant in Iran.'
The sectarian split between Shia and Sunni, coupled with an
ethnic division which pits Arab against Kurd, contributes to
the fractionalization of the Iraqi population. Given Iraq's
large Shiite population, Saddam was gravely concerned that the
Iranian revolution could spread to his country and threaten
his dictatorial regime. This fear was not without grounds, nor
was it wholly unprovoked. Iraq actively repressed Shia
militants in the period before the invasion into Iran.
Tensions seemingly reached a boiling point when, on 8 April
1980, Saddam carried out the execution of Iraqi Shia leader
Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Sadr of Najaf and his sister Bint al
Huda.
This action incensed Khomeini, who declared:
The war that the Iraqi Baath wants to ignite is a war
against Islam. As the Iranian army joined the people (in
their struggle against the Shah) , oh Iraqi army, join your
people. . .The people and army of Iraq must turn their backs
on the Baath regime and overthrow it. . .because this regime
is attacking Iran, attacking Islam and the Quran... Iran
7Khomeini listed his enemies as follows: "First, the
Shah; then the American Satan; then Saddam Hussein and his
infidel Baath Party." The Middle East , 26 July 1982, p. 25.
*Dilip Hiro, The Longest War : The Iran-Iraq Military
Conflict
, (New York: Routledge, 1991) p. 2.
today is the land of God's messenger; and its revolution,
government and laws are Islamic. 9
At this point both Iraq and Iran were actively involved in
destabilizing activities which served as precursors to the
war. Iran began giving guerrilla training to Iraqi Shias and
then sending them back to ply their trade in Iraq. In addition
Iran continued its policy of providing assistance to Iraq's
Kurdish Democratic Party. Baghdad returned the favor by
expelling 16,000 Iraqis of Iranian origin, and increasing aid
to the secessionist elements of the Iranian Kurds. Baghdad
also provided prominent political and military figures from
the ousted Shah's regime with radio stations to broadcast
anti-Khomeini propaganda. In the months leading up to the
Iraqi invasion into Iran, minor border skirmishes were
occurring at the rate of ten per month. 10
When the time seemed opportune Saddam Hussein invaded his
long-time adversary Iran. Hiro speculates that Saddam's
calculations were based largely on the assumption of gridlock
in American policy brought about by election year pressures:
As the months rolled on the question he increasingly
faced was not whether or not to invade, but when. He seems
to have decided to act before the US presidential poll in
early November. It was likely that a new American
president would settle the hostage crisis and re-establish
normal relations with Tehran, thus inadvertently robbing
^Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) , 18 April
1980.
°Hiro, pp. 35-36
him of the opportunity to attack Iran during its most
vulnerable period."
Saddam Hussein grasped at the perceived opportunity to
assume leadership of the Arab world by attacking and defeating
the new Iranian regime while it was still in the formative
period of its development. Egypt, by virtue of its signing a
peace accord with Israel, had been suspended from the Arab
League and as such had lost any claim to leadership in the
Arab world. Saddam saw the time as ripe for an invasion
targeted against the Persians - one which would liberate Arabs
and return Arab territory to the Arab Nation. Saddam sought
and received backing from the Saudi and Kuwaiti regimes for
his ambitious plans. After a series of military and diplomatic
clashes in September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran on the twenty-
second of that month. 12
Thus began the longest conventional war of the twentieth
century. Over million casualties are estimated to have
resulted from this conflict. The cost of conducting this war,
and the direct and indirect damage caused by it, is estimated
at $1,190 billion. The war produced no clear winner or loser.
Rather, it would seem that both sides suffered unacceptable
and, in the author's opinion, avoidable damages. The United
States was drawn into the conflict while attempting to ensure
the free flow of vital petroleum products from the region.
"Hiro, p. 37.
12Hiro, pp. 38-39.
B. THE TANKER WAR
In April 1984 a new and dangerous phase of the Iran-Iraq
war commenced when Iraq began attacking all ships serving
Iranian ports regardless of ownership. As Iraq was
transporting none of its oil via maritime vessels due to the
wartime closure of its only outlet to the sea, Iran sought
indirect retaliation by targeting merchant ships trading with
Iraq's allies, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 13 Within a thirty-five
day period ten oil tankers were hit. President Reagan
condemned Iran for attacking neutral shipping in the Gulf,
while characterizing Iranian vessels as legitimate economic
targets for Iraqi attacks. 14 In June 1984 U.N. Security
Council Resolution 552 condemned attacks on the ships trading
with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, nations which were non-
combatants. 15 The Security Council further called on all
states to respect freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf.
This U.N. action had limited effect on the conduct of the war.
13Hiro, p. 129. See also Hiro, p. 3:
Not surprisingly, short of declaring war against Iran,
both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait aided Iraq materially and
logistically . When Iran retaliated by targeting its oil
tankers, Kuwait turned to the superpowers for the safety
of its vessels, and got a positive response, particularly
from the United States. The Pentagon boosted its naval
presence in the Gulf region from six warships to 32.
14Interview with BBC Television, 31 May 1984.
15United Nations Security Council Resolution 552, 1 June
1984
The tempo of the Tanker war slowed, but there was little move
towards peace. 16
Hiro speculates that it was Saddam's intention to escalate
and broaden the war:
The overall Iraqi purpose in initiating and sustaining
the Tanker War was to make oil shipments from the Gulf
hazardous, thus internationalizing the conflict and
drawing in the superpowers - and/or Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait to join the hostilities formally on Baghdad's side.
The latter development would have opened up a new front
against Iran, severely straining its already depleted air
force and torpedoing Iranian plans to mount land
offensives against Iraq. In the event, Baghdad failed to
achieve either of its objectives. 17
Attacks on oil tankers continued by both belligerents for
several years in a sporadic fashion. In 1985 Iran attacked 14
naval targets, increasing this number to 41 in 1986. Iraq's
figures were 33 for 1985, and a subsequent doubling to 66 in
1986. 18 In February-March 1986 an Iranian ground offensive
targeted against the Fao Peninsula was successful and Iran
appeared to be on the brink of military victory. 19 With Iran
poised to march on Baghdad, Iraq increased its attacks on
Iranian oil tankers. Iran, as it had threatened previously,
responded in kind, by stepping up attacks on Kuwaiti and
16Palmer, p. 109.
17Hiro, pp. 131-132.
18Hiro, p. 175, citing The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1987-1988 , London, 1988,
p. 131.
19Palmer, p. 110.
Kuwaiti- bound ships. iu In early November 1986 the "arms for
hostages" (also known as the Iran-Contra affair) story broke
in the American press. This development complicated American
diplomatic efforts in the Gulf region.
In December 1986 Kuwait requested information from the
U.S. Coast Guard concerning the ref lagging of merchant
vessels. The Kuwaitis apparently saw flagging ships carrying
their oil with the U.S. ensign as a means of protection
against Iranian attacks on the vessels. Kuwait also made
overtures to the Soviet Union about the possibility of flying
the hammer and sickle on its tankers. 21
As the Reagan administration was considering the Kuwaiti
request, the situation in the Gulf grew markedly worse. In
February 1987 intelligence indicated that Iran was deploying
Silkworm antiship missile batteries in the vicinity of the
Strait of Hormuz . In the Reagan administration, there was
disagreement between the Secretaries of State and Defense as
to the wisdom of ref lagging Kuwaiti tankers. Secretary of
State Shultz opposed the idea, while Secretary of Defense
Weinberger recommended the ref lagging. 22
On 17 May 1987 the USS Stark (FFG-31) was struck by two
Exocet missiles launched by an Iraqi Mirage F-l. The Stark
20Ronald O Rourke , "The Tanker War," U.S. Naval Institute






narrowly escaped sinking and 37 American sailors perished as
a direct result of the attack. This event sparked an
impassioned debate over the wisdom of continuing American
naval presence in the war-ridden Gulf. 23
The Reagan administration wasted little time in signalling
U.S. resolve to Gulf allies. On 19 May, a scant two days after
the Stark tragedy, the State Department made the following
announcement
:
Consistent with longstanding U.S. commitment to the flow
of oil through the gulf and the importance we attach to
the freedom of navigation in international waters, as well
as our determination to assist our friends in the gulf,
the President decided that the United States would help in
the protection of Kuwaiti tankers. 24
The United States thereby became a more direct participant in
defending the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf. Operation
Earnest Will, as the reflagging operation became known,
commenced escorting U.S. flagged vessels through the Gulf.
The table on the following page displays the level of
violence perpetrated by both belligerents as the Tanker War
heated up. The majority of these attacks occurred during the
period that the United States had willingly assumed its new
role as the protector of navigational freedom in the Gulf.
23Palmer, p. 114
24Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 19 May 1987, State
Department, Current Documents, 1987, #259.
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TABLE 1
ATTACKS BY IRAN AND IRAQ ON SHIPS IN THE GULF, 1987
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC TOTAL
IRAN 6 3 4 4 10 5 4 5 16 7 10 17 91
IRAQ 6 8 5 7 5 2 3 4 12 13 8 15 88
ATTACKS BY IRAN AND IRAQ ON SHIPS IN THE GULF, 198 8
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL-AUG TOTAL 37-88
IRAN 7 713 7 5 3 10 52 143
IRAQ 856071 11 38 126
Source: Ronald O • Rourke , "The Tanker War," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, May 1988, pp. 32-33.
On 24 July 1987 the Bridgeton, a reflagged Kuwaiti tanker
escorted by U.S. naval forces, struck an Iranian-sown mine in
the central Gulf. The United States commenced a military
buildup in the region in 1987 as the Iranians grew more
confrontational. The number of U.S. naval ships in the Middle
East Force more than doubled from six to thirteen over the
course of 1987. In an effort to provide improved command and
control for this burgeoning military presence, the Department
of Defense, established the Joint Task Force Middle East
(JTFME) in August 1987. USCINCCENT was the unified command




The remainder of the of the Tanker War consisted of a
series of Iranian attacks and U.S. retaliatory actions. The
near-sinking of the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts by mine
damage spurred JTFME to launch Operation Praying Mantis in
April 1988. In the course of this operation and the Iranian
counterattack, Iran lost nearly half its operational ships.
Shortly after Praying Mantis the United States announced that
the Navy would provide direct assistance to neutral vessels
that came under Iranian attack and requested help. 20
The ground war between Iraq and Iran continued. The
economies of both states were in a shambles from supporting
their respective militaries ' activities. The accidental shoot-
down of an Iranian airbus with 290 people aboard by the USS
Vincennes in July 1988, followed shortly thereafter by a
successful Iraqi campaign to recover its lost territories 2 ',
prompted Iran's acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolution
598 28 and signalled the beginning of the end of this long,
expensive, and bloody war.
26Palmer, p. 13 3
27Hiro, p. 241.
28Resolution 598, which was adopted by the Security
Council on 20 July 1987, demanded that: "Iran and Iraq observe
an immediate cease-fire, discontinue all military actions on
land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the
internationally recognized boundaries without delay."
13
After the war, Iraq was deeply in debt 2y and apparently
exhausted after eight years of fierce combat. It was hoped
that a period of relative peace would prevail in the Persian
Gulf region. Many expected that the warring nations would
allow a substantial period of time to pass while permitting
their deep wounds to heal before embarking on any new military
adventures. The efforts of the recently elected Bush
administration to welcome Iraq into the "family of nations""'
would have disastrous consequences for regional peace and
security in the post-Cold War Persian Gulf.
C. OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND STORM
On 2 August 1990 Saddam Hussein carried out the invasion
of Kuwait and subsequently announced the annexation of that
country as Iraq's nineteenth province. In response, a U.S. -led
coalition ejected Iraqi forces and liberated Kuwait on 28
February 1991. The history of that recent and widely reported
war is well known. This subsection examines issues raised as
a result of that war which could provide salient lessons for
the planning and conduct of future operations in the Gulf
region.
29Norman Friedman, Desert Victory
,
(Annapolis, Md: Naval
Institute Press, 1991), p. 31. Friedman reports Iraq's post-
war debt burden as being approximately $80 billion.
30President Bush used this phrase in the Presidential
election debates in October 1992 when attempting to defend his
administration's policies toward Iraq in the period leading up
to the invasion of Kuwait.
14
Operation Desert Storm was the first major crisis since
World War II that was not constrained by an overriding East-
West dimension. Given the collapse of the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact, this factor will almost certainly continue to
affect such conflicts in the foreseeable future. In the "new
world order" many strategic maxims concerning deterrence and
warfighting must be reexamined given the massive political
changes that have occurred in the international system. Forty-
five years of formulation and refinement of containment
stratagems will have limited application in the new
environment. The U.S. national security community is well
aware of this altered state of affairs, and this is reflected
in the new National Military Strategy. The U.S. post-Desert
Storm military strategy is therefore more regionally focused
than it had been in the past. The likelihood of a protracted
global war is seen as low in the near-term.
In analyzing the events leading up to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait with an eye toward preventing such provocations in the
future, it is first necessary to understand the motivations
which led Saddam to embark on this dangerous venture. Fred
Halliday cites five elements which contributed to Saddam's
decision. 3I
First was the failure of Iraq to impose a capitulationist
peace on Iran in the wake of their eight-year war. It became
MFred Halliday, "The Gulf War and its aftermath,"
International Affairs 67 , 2(1991), pp. 223-234.
15
increasingly clear that Iraq, after the post-Khomeni
government in Tehran consolidated in late 1989, was blocked on
its eastern border. Second was the dire financial straits in
which Iraq found itself after the war with Iran. The seizure
of Kuwait and its oil reserves appeared to offer Saddam a way
out of his debt of $70 billion as well as a distraction from
domestic problems of his own making. Third, the end of the
Cold War encouraged Saddam to take a more confrontational
position towards the United States. Earlier in 1990 Saddam had
called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region as
well as an Arab financial boycott of the United States.
The fourth element which motivated Saddam was his
dispute (s) with Kuwait. In addition to a long-standing
disagreement concerning border issues, four other problems
soured the Iraq-Kuwait relationship: 1) Iraq demanded that all
of its war debts owed to Kuwait be canceled; 2) Saddam
insisted that Kuwait pay for Iraq's defense of Arab interests
in the war with Iran; 3) Saddam charged that Kuwait and the
Emirates had deprived Iraq of oil revenues by their unfair
pricing and production quota practices; and 4) Saddam
contended that Kuwait had unfairly taken oil from the border
area, specifically from the Rumaila field.
The final element which seems to have motivated Saddam to
attack, in Halliday's opinion, was the stalemate in resolving
Arab-Israeli disputes. This condition provided Iraq with an
opportunity to reassert its claims to regional leadership. A
16
lack of progress in settling the Palestinian issue, coupled
with the huge influx of Soviet Jews into Israel, encouraged a
"climate of frustration" in the Arab world. Saddam believed he
could use this climate to his own advantage. 32
Certainly another reason which influenced Saddam's
decision to invade Kuwait resulted from Washington not
communicating a clear signal on the conseguences of such a
rash action. Ambassador Glaspie's consultations with Saddam
immediately prior to his launching of the offensive clearly
had little if any deterrent effect. In fact, exactly the
opposite case can be argued; that this ambiguous signal
actually encouraged the Iragi dictator to invade. The message,
at least as perceived by Saddam, appears to have been that
this was being considered as an inter-Arab dispute and the
U.S. would not get involved. Whether this was a message, a
messenger
,
or a perception problem remains unclear. What
certainly is clear is that this can be construed as a failure
of tremendous magnitude in American diplomacy.
The conduct of the build-up (Desert Shield) to, and the
actual fighting of (Desert Storm) , the war has been well
documented elsewhere. The war accomplished the stated
32When speaking of Saddam and Irag, it is sometimes
difficult to distinguish the man from the nation. This is not
unusual in dictatorial regimes. When a megalomaniac seizes
control of a state, the aggrieved nation, and specifically its
instruments of power (the military, parliament, courts, etc.)
freguently become indistinguishable from the dictator. Thus
the policies, actions, positions, etc. of Irag are, in
essence, those of its leader.
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objectives of ousting Iraqi troops and returning the pre-war
Kuwaiti government to power. This war was notable for several
characteristics. First and foremost were the new post-Cold War
auspices. The five permanent members of the Security Council 5,
resisted using their veto powers to make ideological points.
This was virtually unprecedented given such a weighty use of
the Council's powers granted under Chapter Seven of the U.N.
Charter.
In Clausewitzian terms, Desert Shield/Storm was a good
example of the proper way to wage war. One of Clausewitz ' s
more popular and enduring constructs is that of the
"remarkable trinity" of warfare. 34 The first element of the
trinity is the violence and passion which is embodied in the
people. The Gulf War, at least once the fighting began in
earnest, enjoyed broad-based public support in the United
States. 3i It was generally perceived as being a just and
33The United States, Soviet Union, China, France and Great
Britain comprise the permanent membership of the Security
Council at this writing. Moves are currently afoot to alter or
expand the five permanent memberships.
34 Peter Paret ed.
,
Makers of Modern Strategy , (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 201.
35A CBS News/New York Times Poll during 11-13 Jan 1991
asked Americans: "If Iraq does not withdraw by (15 Jan), do
you think the United States should start military action
against Iraq...?" 47% responded "start action"; 46% answered
"wait to see"; 7% were unsure. President Bush's approval
rating was 66%
The same poll taken on 19 Jan indicated that 74% thought
that the "U.S. did the right thing to begin fighting". The
President's approval rating on his handling of Iraq was 80%.
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necessary conflict. 36 This sentiment was, for the most part,
echoed throughout the world.
The second element of the trinity: "uncertainty and
chance, provides scope primarily to the courage,
determination, and talent of the commander and his forces."* 7
This element manifests itself in the military. From the
coalition perspective, the military units of the winning side
accounted themselves, with very few exceptions, admirably. In
terms of casualties inflicted, the coalition enjoyed an
extreme asymmetrical advantage. Although an accurate "body
count" of the number of Iraqi soldiers killed has yet to be
compiled, estimates run anywhere from 10,000 to over 100,000.
And while the glow of the initial military victory has dulled
somewhat with the passage of time and the publication of
somewhat more critical analyses of the action, most informed
observers still generally consider Desert Storm to have been
an overwhelming and decisive military victory for the United
States and its coalition partners. Thus, the first two legs of
the trinity appear to have been anchored firmly.
Source: Michael Brenner, "The Alliance: a Gulf post-mortem,"
International Affairs 67 , 4(1991), p. 668.
36For arguments (pro and con) on the morality and justice
of the war see: David E. Decosse, ed . , But Was It Just?
Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War , (New
York, Doubleday, a division of Doubleday Dell Publishing
Group, 1992)
37Paret, p. 2 01.
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The final element of the trinity, politics, "is the
business of government alone."' 1* The politics of the Gulf War
involved not only the governments of the United States and the
other coalition members states, but also, to an unprecedented
extent, the United Nations. The U.N. Security Council passed
a series of resolutions condemning the Iragi invasion of
Kuwait. These resolutions culminated in #678, adopted on 29
November, which authorized U.N. members to use "all means
necessary" to enforce previous resolutions if Iragi forces did
not depart Kuwait by 15 January 1991s 3S Thus, the United
Nations, as the world's preeminent international governmental
organization, took a strong stance in rejecting Iraq's
invasion and attempted annexation of Kuwait.
The situation as it concerned the domestic American
political debate was dealt with less resolutely. The debate
was not formally joined in the Congress until January 1991.
The opposing sides argued their respective cases; on the one
38Carl von Clausewitz , On War , trans, and ed . Michael
Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1984), bk. I, ch.
I, p. 89.
iq0f particular note were Security Council resolutions:
660 (2 Aug 90) -condemned invasion, demanded withdrawal; 666 (6
Aug) -imposed embargo on Irag; 665 (25 Aug) -made naval
inspections to verify cargoes legal; 670 (25 Sep) -expanded
embargo to include air traffic. Most of these resolutions
passed by an overwhelming margin. Cuba and Yemen were notable
among non-permanent council members in voting against or
abstaining from several resolutions. On the key resolution
#678, Cuba and Yemen voted against; while China, a permanent
member with veto power, abstained.
Source: James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield ro
Storm , (New York, William Morrow and Inc., 1992) pp. 34-35.
20
side for giving economic sanctions more time to work 40 ; and,
on the other, for mounting the counter-offensive against Iragi
forces shortly on or shortly after the U.N. deadline of 15
January. 41 On January 12 the resolution authorizing the
President to wage war against Irag passed in both houses. 42
The tally in the Senate was 52 to 47, in the House it was 250
to 183, to allow the President to use force, if reguired, to
end the Gulf crisis. 43
To the credit of the Congress, once the war resolution had
passed, the members closed ranks and voted unanimously to
40See: William M. Vogt and Carl A. Gnam eds., Desert
Storm
, (Leesburg, Va., Empire Press, 1991), p. 41. Senator
Paul D. Wellstone (D-MN) insisted:
This cause is not worth fighting for now. We must stay the
course with economic sanctions, continue the sgueeze,
continue the pressure, move forward on the diplomatic
front, and, Mr. President, we must not rush into war.
41 Ibid. On the Senate floor Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)
offered the following counter-argument to continuing with
sanctions alone:
Sanctions are a blunt instrument which hurt civilians
before the military; weak before the strong. Is it more
moral to adopt a strategy designed to inflict the most
punishment on the poorest, oldest, most infirm elements of
Irag's population? If you think sanctions will work, you
must think they will bring terrible destruction on the
heads of the Iragi people themselves. Consider the
morality of that result before decrying the immorality of
war.
42 Ibid. The proposal, titled the "Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Irag Resolution," was strongly
supported by President Bush. One of the sponsors of the
proposal, Rep. Dante Fascell (R-Fla.), termed the resolution
the "practical eguivalent" of a declaration of war.
43Thomas B. Allen, F. Clinton Berry and Norman Polmar, War
In The Gulf
.
(Atlanta, Turner Publishing Inc., 1991), p. 85.
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support the President's decision to initiate the war. Minority
leader Robert Dole (R-KAN) stated:
As soon as the vote was completed, there was a change
across the country. The people realized that Congress has
a role to play, and played it in this situation. The
American people were waiting for Congress to make a
judgement. When the Congress did, then the people swung
behind the President. 44
Whether there was a causal relationship between the Congress's
vote to support the war and the public's support for the war
is highly debatable. In the author's opinion the public would
have supported the war effort whether the Congress had voted
to approve it or not. 45
Thus, it would appear that at the commencement of the
coalition counter-offensive (or, in the case of the people,
perhaps shortly thereafter) to reestablish by force the
sovereignty of Kuwait, all three elements of Clausewitz's
"remarkable trinity" were in place. That each of the elements
was not perfectly and harmoniously in balance is granted.
However, given the end-result of the operation (the
overwhelming coalition victory) it would seem that this part
of Clausewitz's analysis of war has stood the test of time.
The Persian Gulf war was, in terms of the mobilization
involved and the weaponry used, the largest interstate
44 Ibid, p. 85
45Whether the President needed Congressional authorization
to commence hostilities is still hotly debated between the
executive and legislative branches. The constitutionality of
the War Powers Resolution has yet to be tested in a court of
law.
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conflict since the Korean conflict. 46 Militarily, the war was
tremendously successful for the coalition forces. Politically,
perhaps, it was somewhat less decisive. Saddam Hussein and his
Baathist regime remain in power in Iraq, while President Bush
lost his 1992 re-election bid. Participatory democracy does
not appear to be significantly on the rise in the region,
despite some recent progress. 47 Regional tension is still
palpable. A potential power vacuum exists between Iran and the
Gulf Cooperation Council nations of the Arabian peninsula.
The Gulf War was notable in that U.S. forces were aligned
with combat and support units of 28 other countries when the
counter-offensive started during the night of 17 January 1991.
For the United States this was the first true experience in
coalition diplomacy and warfare since World War II. Saddam
chose a deliberate strategy of seeking to lure Israel into the
conflict by retaliating for Scuds lobbed into its population
centers in an attempt to weaken the coalition aligned against
him. Washington employed skillful diplomacy to ensure that
46Halliday, p. 223.
47Chris Hedges, "Kuwaiti Men Elect A Parliament," New York
Times , 6 Oct 1992, p. A-5:
The elections are the first since the Emir ... closed the
Parliament in 1986 and suspended the constitution. They
fulfill a promise the Emir made to Kuwaitis when he was
exiled in Saudi Arabia during the Iraqi occupation, a
promise that earned him the support of opposition groups
during the Persian Gulf conflict.
It should be noted all Kuwaiti women were prohibited from
voting in this election. Only men who could trace their
families in the Emirate prior to 1921, only 13.4% of the
population, were allowed to cast their ballots.
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this would not happen. Norman Friedman described the perils
the Bush administration faced:
It demanded a high order of diplomatic skill. Whatever the
balance of contributions to the overall power of the
coalition, Washington could never appear to be forcing its
partners. Yet the U.S. government always knew that the
decisive action which so frightened the coalition partners
was exactly what was required to deal with Iraq. Saddam
was ever aware of opportunities to split the coalition,
and his charqe was always much the same: the Arab
coalition partners were acquiescing in a projected or
actual massacre of the faithful orchestrated by the
greatest of the infidel powers. Through the war, his
missile attacks on Israel were designed to demonstrate
that his Arab enemies were, in effect Israeli
collaborators. For its part, the U.S. government always
had to fear that any Israel retaliation would cause the
Arab members of the coalition to bolt for fear that
Saddam's charge would stick. 48
Some observers speculate that any U.S. military
involvement in future Gulf crises will necessarily be
as the leader, or at minimum as a member, of some sort of
multilateral coalition. They seem to rule out the possibility
of unilateral military action by U.S. forces. Michael Brenner
speculates:
Looking ahead, it is hard to visualize a situation at
all analogous to that in the Gulf where a substantial,
direct participation by allies would not be an absolute
precondition for American military involvement. While a
president might feel compelled to act to protect a
threatened national interest without a prior guarantee of
a major allied contribution, backing for a sustained
commitment will not be forthcoming. One should never say
x Never' , but 'Never again' probably does sum up





congressional and popular feeling about a solo response to
any future emergency calls. 4g
Vice Admiral William Owens, USN, argues that the United
States will have to rely increasingly on combined operations 30
in the future, given planned US force reductions. He makes the
case that a burden-sharing and specialization scheme could
result in:
"...freeing some of our (U.S.) forces and allowing them to
better compensate for reductions .... This kind of
dependency is in a sense more stable and healthier than
the kind that existed during the Cold War." 31
Owens went on to point out the differences of coalitions as
opposed to alliances:
Coalitions differ from alliances. They are issue-
oriented and short-term and their membership may include
nations that are far from traditional allies. Since they
tend to emerge as a crisis unfolds, we need to establish
conditions that facilitate building supportive coalitions
guickly in time of need before we confront specific
crises. The best way of doing this is to establish trust
and communications with as wide a range of nations as
possible.*12
49Michael Brenner, "The Alliance: a Gulf Post-Mortem,
"
International Affairs 67, 4 (1991), p. 669,
50Combined operations involve the forces of two or more
nations acting in concert. This contrasts with joint
operations which involve two or more services (e.g. US Navy
and Air Force)
.
51Vice Admiral William Owens, USN, "Mediterranean Fleet A
Test-bed for Navy's Future," Armed Forces Journal
International , July 1992, p. 35.
"ibid, p. 35.
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D. THE GULF REGION AFTER DESERT STORM
The euphoria much of the world felt after the one-sided
military victory in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations was
decidedly short-lived. The hope that peace and stability would
reign in the Gulf region in the aftermath of the coalition
victory was crushed in short order by subsequent events.
Rebellions within Iraq by Shiite and Kurdish dissident groups
were brutally crushed by Saddam's remaining forces. Coalition
forces were called into action again after the cease-fire to
"provide comfort" to Kurdish refugees that were fleeing
northward from ruthless Iraqi repression. Saddam also was
successful in crushing the Iranian-backed Shiite uprising in
southern Iraq in the aftermath of Desert Storm."' 3
In response, a combined U. S . -British-French sponsored "no
fly" zone was established in April of 1991 north of the 36th
parallel to prevent Iraqi air attacks on the fleeing Kurds. 14
This restriction on Iraqi flight operations, as of this
writing, has been in effect for 20 months. The prolonged
presence of coalition protection forces in northern Iraq, and
the coalition aircraft which are enforcing the flight ban and
staging out of Turkish air bases, offer no promise of a
53
"A Dangerous Game in the Gulf," Newsweek , 21 Sep 92, p
58.
54
"Death Every Day," Time , 22 Apr 92, p. 40
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t^ullout any time soon. 55 Additionally, in response to stepped
up attacks on Shiite Moslem rebels, the United States,
Britain, and France established a "no-fly" zone in Iraq south




No-Fly Zones in Northern and Southern Iraq
55An anonymous source on the J-5 directorate of the Joint
Staff offered little hope that Operation Provide Comfort II
would cease in the foreseeable future.
56Shay S. Wessol, "In the Persian Gulf, peace has a high
price," Navv Times . 21 Sep 92, p. 20.
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Operation Southern Watch, in its fourth month as of this
writing, could also prove to be a long-term commitment. House
Armed Services Committee Chairman, Les Aspin (D-Wis), stated
he would not be surprised if Saddam were to challenge the
flight ban:
I believe the United States and its coalition partners
should be ready to use air power to blunt an Iraqi attack
in either the north or the south .... This would be a
significant escalation, but I am not sure we can afford to
do otherwise. We should remember that we don't do very
well when we are surprised. We must start thinking now
about how we might respond to Saddam's countermoves . ""
With Iraq effectively broken up into three zones (Kurds in
the north, a Shiite south, and Saddam's regime appearing, for
now, secure in the center region) and its sovereignty
challenged by the ongoing and intrusive U.N. inspections which
seek to destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction58 , there is
fear among many regional nations that a severe power vacuum
may occur. Nations other than Iraq, with sizeable Kurdish
"Quoted in: Rick Maze, "Don't be laid-back about Iraq:
Aspin," Navy Times , 21 Sep 1992, p. 38.
58Paul Lewis, "New Wave of Iraqi Executions Reported," New
York Times , 21 Sep 92, p. A-2
:
Next month will also bring a major United Nations search
in Iraq for undeclared Scud missiles, which the
organization's inspectors are now convinced Baghdad is
still hiding, officials say. Earlier this year, Robert M.
Gates, the Director of Central Intelligence, told Congress
that Iraq might be concealing as many as 200 such
missiles.
The United Nations special commission charged with
eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction has reached
a similar conclusion, officials say, based on new evidence
that Iraq had other sources of missile technology besides
the Soviet Union.
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populations (Iran, Turkey, and Syria) fear the creation of an
independent Kurdistan would impinge on their territorial
integrity
.
Additionally Saddam's grip on power shows signs of
weakening. There have been rumors of unsuccessful
assassination attempts on Saddam in addition to foiled coup
d'etat attempts
.
59 If Saddam's Baathist regime were to fall,
it is uncertain what would replace it. Many Middle East
observers speculate that Iran would attempt to fill any power
vacuum created by the dissolution of Iraq as it now exists. A
senior U.S. official commented: "Whether under the Shah or the
Ayatollah, Iran has always regarded itself, by right, as the
dominant power in the Gulf." Martin Indyk, director of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy says:
The logical consequence of the no-fly zone, if it persists
for long, is the disintegration of Iraq. And if that
occurs, the Iranians are better positioned than anyone
else to have influence over a new Shiite state in the
south. 60
59
"Saddam reportedly executed army officers to avert
coup," Associated Press report in The Sunday Herald (Monterey,
Ca)
,
4 Oct 92, p. 2A. This report cites multiple sources which
claim Saddam ordered the execution of a Major General
decorated for bravery in the Iran-Iraq War and 30 other
military officers who were plotting a military coup to
overthrow the government. The executions reportedly occurred
in September 1992.
60Quoted from: A Dangerous Game in the Gulf," Newsweek , 21
Sep 92, p. 58.
29
A top U.S. official acknowledges that a resurgent Iran could
alter the balance of power in the region, put places a more
realpolitik oriented spin on the equation:
Saddam is the immediate risk to stability in the region,
so getting rid of him has to be the immediate priority.
Are we blind to the prospects for greater Iranian
influence? Of course not. But we think they are self-
limiting - at least for now." 1
If Saddam is to fall, and this is one of the repeatedly
stated policy goals of the current administration, the United
States cannot afford to sit idly by and wait for the dust to
settle if it is to advance the nation's interests in the
region. We must have a clear strategic plan in place to deal
with regional contingencies. President of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Morton Abramowitz stresses
the need for a rational plan in dealing with this region's
uncertain future:
...any U.S. administration will have to come to grips with
questions bigger than whether Saddam stays or goes. It
will have to decide whether it is prepared to break with
the political status quo in the gulf. Are we now willing
to invest in a long-term effort to create a democratic
federated Iraq? Dare we risk the disintegration of this
70-year-old amalgam cobbled together by British
colonialism? Or do we simply drift back to acceptance of
something like the pre-gulf-war Iraq with a new face but
much the same old dictatorship? Or even with Saddam?
Regional attitudes make a decision difficult, and one
senses an inclination to avoid the tough choices or admit
those that have been made. 62
M Ibid.
"•Morton Abramowitz, "A Kurdish Country: How Long Can It
Last," Newsweek , 21 Sep 92, p. 59.
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The Iraqi situation is far from the only destabilizing
influence in the Persian Gulf region. The latest round of
Arab-Israeli peace talks, those brokered by the U.S. State
Department after the war, have made only halting progress. Few
if any real steps have been taken to bring about a true and
enduring peace between the only democracy in the region and
its Arab neighbors.
The election of a Labor government on June 23, 1992 03
offers indications that the Israelis could possibly be willing
to trade land for peace. Bilateral negotiations with Syria
appear to be making a modicum of progress, despite the
frequent hard-line rhetoric emanating from both parties. The
Israeli government has given strong hints that they could be
ready to concede a partial withdrawal from the disputed Golan
Heights which were seized in the 1967 war. 64 The Arab-Israeli
disputes, while admittedly linked inextricably to Gulf
security concerns, lie beyond the scope of this thesis. While
the greater Arab-Israeli conflict hangs ominously over all
63The Economist , June 27 th - July 3 rd
,
p. 14.
^Thomas L. Friedman, "Israel Presents Peace Outline But
Syria Is Cool," New York Times , 15 Sep 92, p. A-6:
Syria continues to steadfastly press for a complete
Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Syria's chief
negotiator, Mouwafak al-Allaf, said there could possibly
be elements of this Israeli proposal which would appeal to
Syria. However, he reiterated Syria's hard-line
negotiating position when he said that no offer could be
acceptable without dealing with Syria's fundamental desire
for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories.
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political and security considerations in the region and has to
be factored into any equation attempting to achieve an overall
strategic balance, this thesis intentionally limits its scope
to those nation-states bordering the Persian Gulf littoral.'53
The security relationship between Israel and the Gulf nations
is a subject for further research.
Iran is currently involved in a dispute with the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) over three small islands (Abu Musa,
Greater and Lesser Tunb) which dominate the western approaches
to the Strait of Hormuz . In 1971 the emirate of Sharja, before
Britain ceded its protectorate and Sharja became one of the
United Arab Emirates, permitted Iran to station a garrison on
its long-held island of Abu Musa. Iran has since refused to
recognize the UAE ' s sovereignty over the disputed islands.
In August 1992 Iranian officials on Abu Musa refused to
let passengers on a ship from the Emirates disembark on the
island. This provoked a condemnation by all 21 members of the
Arab League of Iran's attempts to annex the islands. The Arab
League gave support to the UAE's "right" to the islands and
labeled the Iranian action as "an occupation." The United
States has also publicly supported the position of the
Emirates vis-a-vis the disputed islands. The U.S. support led
the current Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to
65Iran, Iraq, and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE)
,
Qatar, and Oman) are the focus of the
remainder of this thesis.
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denounce the dispute as a conspiracy by Washington "to justify
its illegitimate presence in the Persian Gulf." Iranian
President Hashemi Rafsanjani raised tensions further by
directing the Islamic Revolutionary Guards to assume "decisive
popular and military readiness. . . .Committed military readiness
is the only solution to the obstacle put in our way." 00
Tensions also exist within the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) itself. In October 1992 a border dispute between Qatar
and Saudi Arabia flared up. Qatar accused Saudi forces of
illegally occupying a Qatari border post and killing two
people. Qatar demanded the withdrawal of the Saudi troops.
Riyadh denied that Saudi forces were involved in the incident.
Qatar's foreign minister gave the Saudi Ambassador "a protest
memorandum. .. on the unjustified attack by Saudi military
forces on Qatar's al-Khofous post." Qatar also demanded prompt
negotiations for agreement on final demarcation of the
borders. 67 This incident, although minor, could serve to
weaken alliance cohesion should the nations be forced to take
up arms against a common enemy.
°°"Iran Says Its Critics In Dispute Over Isles Are Part of
U.S. Plot," New York Times , 17 Sep 92, p. A-4
.
67
"Qatar Orders Saudi Forces to Withdraw," Associated
Press report in The Monterey County Herald, 4 Oct 92.
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E. CONCLUSIONS
The Persian Gulf region has a long history of interstate
conflict. During the most recent hostilities the United States
was involved in varying degrees. From the not so tacit support
of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War and as the guarantor of freedom
of navigation through the Gulf during the Tanker War, to
America's leadership of the Coalition which ousted Saddam's
occupying forces out of Kuwait, the United States has been a
major participant in Persian Gulf affairs. In the post-Gulf
War environment the potential for conflict remains high. The
United States could well find itself embroiled in yet another
Persian Gulf conflict in the not so distant future.
The question for U.S. policymakers must be whether or not
the United States should continue to play such a large role in
the affairs of this region. As long as oil remains the primary
fuel for economic growth, the United States has little choice
but to protect its interests in this vital region. Short of a
drastic reordering of national energy policy, the United
States must ensure the free flow of petroleum from the Gulf
region if the nation is to continue to prosper economically.
The United States' need to remain involved in this
region's affairs is taken as a given in the short- to medium-
term. The nation cannot retool its industries overnight to run
on alternative sources of energy. Additionally, there is
little evidence that America is serious about the frequently
stated claims of the need to wean itself from dependence on
34
fossil fuels. This debate has been marked by much talk and
precious little concrete action. For the near-term, America's
addiction to oil shows little prospect for rehabilitation.
Therefore, America needs a strategic plan to deter regional
conflict in the Gulf region. Furthermore, should deterrence
fail, the United States must be prepared to end any regional




In a 21 September 1992 speech before the United Nations
General Assembly, President Bush called
. . .the strategic challenge of the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, truly the fastest-growing security
challenge. . . .1 want to announce my intention today to work
with the United States Congress to redirect the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency... to refocus
its talents on providing technical support for
nonproliferation, weapons monitoring and destruction, and
global defense conversion. 68
The Persian Gulf would certainly seem to qualify as a critical
region in which to focus future nonproliferation efforts.
Over the past two decades the Middle East has had the
distinction of being the world's largest arms market. In the
decade of the 1980s, one third (by value) of the weapons
traded internationally ended up in the Middle East. hS The
International Monetary Fund reports that between 1972 and 1988
the nations of the Middle East spent 11.6 percent of their
68
"Excerpts From Address By President to the U.N.," New
York Times , 22 Sep 92, p. A-7
.
69U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers (1989) , (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, October, 1990)
, pp. 72-76.
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gross domestic product (GDP) on military expenditures. This is
higher than any other region of the world. 7"
In several Gulf states the ratio of defense expenditures
during the same time frame (1972-1988) was even more dramatic.
Oman had the highest defense expenditure as a percent of GDP
of any nation in the world, 23.2%. Saudi Arabia was fourth
with 17%. Iraq was sixth with 16.3%. 71 When the level of
militarization is expressed in terms of expenditures per
capita, Gulf states dominate the list of the top twenty
nations. In 1987 behind Israel as the number one per capita
spender were; Saudi Arabia (2); Oman (5); the United Arab
Emirates (6); Kuwait (9); Iraq (14) and Qatar (18). For
purposes of comparison, the primary Cold War combatants, the
United States and the Soviet Union, were third and seventh on
the top twenty list respectively. 72
That the Gulf region is highly militarized is beyond
dispute. This chapter examines proliferation trends in the
region, both nuclear and conventional. The larger question,
however, is whether a high level of military expenditure
enhances or degrades regional security? This question is akin
70Yahya Sadowski, "Scuds versus Butter: The Political
Economy of Arms Control in the Arab World," Middle East
Report , July-August 1992, p. 4.
71Daniel P. Hewitt, Military Expenditure: International
Comparison of Trends
,
(International Monetary Fund, May 1991)
,
Table 3.




to the bumper sticker slogans espoused by the National Rifle
Association: "If guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have
guns" and "Guns don't kill people, people kill people." Former
Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, in arguing to
Congress that efforts to stem the flow of arms into the Middle
East were pointless, made a similar point: "...Wars are made
by men--not the weapons with which they equip their armies--
and any policy that fails to comprehend that enduring truth is
certain to go wrong." 73
Whether you accept the contention that armed conflict is
encouraged by large and modern armament inventories, or not,
the fact remains that arms continue to flow into the Gulf
region at an alarming rate. Several disturbing trends indicate
that the regional arms race is intensifying in the wake of the
1991 Gulf War.
B. NUCLEAR ARMS PROLIFERATION
Leonard Spector, director of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, saw
a new chapter in the nuclear history of the Middle East
beginning to unfold in 1991. While Iraq's massive nuclear
weapons program was exposed and effectively halted in the
73Defense News , 6 May 91, p. 16
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aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War 74 , Iran dramatically had begun
to accelerate its own nuclear program." At the same time, the
level of Iraq's pre-Gulf War nuclear developments raised
serious questions about the ability of the intelligence
communities of the United States and other concerned states to
detect clandestine nuclear weapons programs. 76
Spector concedes that a majority of Iraq's nuclear weapons
installations were destroyed by U.S. bombing raids in the war.
He further points out that, in an effort to deceive U.N.
inspectors, Iraq itself dismantled many other installations
that had been unknown to the United States and its coalition
partners. However, Spector postulates that Iraq may have been
able to retain some capacity to reconstitute its nuclear
weapons program:
Although pressure from the Security Council, the United
States, and several other major powers ultimately led Iraq
to comply with many U.N. demands for information and
access to facilities, Iraq may still have been able to
74David Makovsky, "Iraqi Shell Game," Newsweek , 5 Oct 92,
p. 25. While the U.N. has claimed that the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program has been effectively eliminated, several
senior Pentagon officials are notably less sanguine. A senior
military intelligence officer has stated, "He (Saddam Hussein)
has Scud missiles. He still has parts of his chemical,
biological and nuclear program." U.S. officials assert that,
while the U.N. inspections have been largely successful, much
follow-up work still needs to be done to prevent Iraq from
reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. The senior
intelligence officer stated, "We have disrupted Iraq's
program, but we have not changed their mind."
"Leonard S. Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle
East," Orbis, Spring, 1992, p. 181.
76Ibid, p. 185.
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withhold some of its nuclear equipment and material from
the inspection teams, along with the bulk of the program's
technical documents. Thus, the potential clearly remains
for Iraq to reconstitute its nuclear program at some
future time. Iraq's potential would be greatly enhanced,
moreover, if it possessed--and had successfully hidden
from the inspectors—weapons-grade uranium or the ability
to produce it/
Spector believes that if the United Nations diligently
applies its monitoring procedures, it can probably ensure that
Iraq will be unable to acquire nuclear arms before the year
2000. However, he is deeply concerned that Iraq may possess an
undeclared stock of weapons-grade uranium. He cautions that,
as the American electorate increasingly insists that domestic
economic issues take precedence over foreign affairs, the
administration:
...could become reluctant to risk another crisis over
Iraq. As a result, the effectiveness of the U.N.
monitoring effort could wane in the months ahead, opening
the way to a resurgence of Iraq's bid for nuclear arms. 78
Iran, according to official U.S. sources, is actively
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. 7S It is becoming
increasingly apparent after the Gulf War that Iran has
accelerated its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. There are
strong indications that Iran has embarked on research which
will eventually lead to the production of weapons-grade
77Ibid, p. 185
78Ibid, p. 186
79Testimony of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, before the
Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials of
the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives, 22 Feb 89.
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nuclear materials. Evidence began to mount in the late 1980s
of Iran's desires to field a nuclear weapons capability.
Iran's then-president Sayyed x Ali Kamenei announced in a 1987
speech at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran:
Regarding atomic energy, we need it now... Our nation has
always been threatened from outside. The least we can do
to face this danger is to let our enemies know that we can
defend ourselves. Therefore, every step you take here is
in defense of your country and your revolution. With this
in mind, you should work hard and at great speed. 8U
In 1988 the rhetoric concerning weapons of mass
destruction was upped a notch. Commander-in-chief of the
Iranian armed forces, now President of Iran, Hashemi
Rafsanjani exhorted a group of Iranian soldiers to:
fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive
use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.
From now on, you should make use of the opportunity and
perform this task. 81
In 1991 Ayatollah Mohajerani, Iran's deputy president, made
the case for a nuclear arms capability in the Islamic world
when he declared that "because the enemy has nuclear
facilities, the Muslim states too should be equipped with the
same capacity." 82
80David Segal, "Atomic Ayatollahs," The Washington Post,
April 12, 1987.
81
"Hashemi-Rafsanjani Speaks on the Future of IRGC
(Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps)." FBIS, Daily Report: The
Near East and South Asia , 7 Oct 88, from Tehran Domestic
Service, 6 Oct 88.
82The Washington Post , 30 Oct 91.
41
Iran has received considerable assistance in its quest to
acquire nuclear weapons from China. On 10 September 1992 the
Tehran and Beijing governments announced that China would
supply Iran with its first nuclear power plant. China had
previously supplied Iran with a small calutron. This type of
equipment was used by Iraq to produce weapons-grade uranium.
Although both China and Iran claim that their cooperation in
nuclear matters is for peaceful purposes (the International
Atomic Energy Agency has found nothing in their inspections to
disprove this assertion), the existence of the reactor,
calutron, and the injection of dozens (perhaps hundreds) of
Chinese nuclear technicians into Iran does little to dispel
suspicions that Iran is serious about acquiring a nuclear
weapons capability. 83
Iran and China signed a ten-year agreement for the
transfer of military equipment and technology and scientific
cooperation in 1990. During a four-day visit to Beijing in
September 1992 President Rafsanjani expressed hope that Iran's
already close technical ' cooperation with China would expand.
"Our cooperation with China has constantly been increasing."
He further stated that he hoped his visit "will help to
enhance our cooperation and make it more comprehensive in many
new areas. " 84
"Elaine Sciolino, "China to Build Nuclear Plant for




The United States has actively opposed any nation which
has expressed an interest in helping Iran in developing a
nuclear capability. Argentina, after urging from the United
States, canceled a deal to sell Iran enriched uranium. China,
which often appears to receive kid-glove treatment from the
Bush administration in an attempt to keep lines of
communication open, has resisted repeated White House appeals
to stop cooperating with Iran in nuclear matters. The Bush
administration's decision to sell up to 150 F-16 fighters to
Taiwan would appear to have affected the timing of China's
announcement of the nuclear cooperation with Iran."
Other potential suppliers of nuclear technology, or even
nuclear weapons themselves, are the republics of the former
Soviet Union. Spector worries that the erosion of non-
proliferation controls in the C.I.S. could permit:
. . .Middle Eastern countries with nuclear ambitions to gain
access to Soviet nuclear-weapons scientists, weapons-grade
nuclear materials, and even nuclear weapons themselves.
Iran, Iraq, Syria, . . .might all hope to use such nuclear
assets to accelerate their advance towards nuclear
armaments .... If nuclear controls break down in the
Commonwealth of Independent States, the flow of nuclear
know-how and materials to the Middle East could overpower
existing mechanisms for curbing the spread of nuclear arms
and open an extremely dangerous new era for the region--
and for the international community at large. 86
Newspaper reports of October 1992 indicated that Iran may




the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan. Allegedly the
weapons had already been paid for but not yet delivered. This
report came only one month after Kazakhstan's prime minister
had pledged to Israel that his country would not sell any of
the nuclear arms that it took possession of when the Soviet
Union broke up. "Nuclear weapons will not be sold to any other
country. Kazakhstan is peace-loving," vowed the prime minister
to the Israeli president. It should be noted that these
allegations of Iranian maneuverings to obtain nuclear weapons
were made by the director of a leading Iranian opposition
group, the People's Mu jahedeen, and have not yet been
independently verified. If true, however, and Iran manages to
marry up the weapons with a suitable delivery platform, the
regional balance of power equations will have to be
significantly revised. 87
C. CONVENTIONAL ARMS PROLIFERATION
Already highly militarized before Desert Storm, the states
of the Gulf region have continued their build-ups in the post-
war period. The lesson that Arab brotherhood was no guarantee
against invasion by a fellow Arab was not lost on the Gulf
sultans. Thus, Iran was already keenly aware that an Arab
87Nick Ludington, "Former Soviet republic selling nuclear
bombs to Iran, group says," Associated Press report in The
Monterey County Herald , 12 Oct 92, p. 2A.
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state such as Iraq would have little remorse in attacking the
non-Arab Persians.
Shortly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, King Fahd
announced plans which would effectively triple the size of the
Saudi armed forces to roughly 200,000 troops. After the war
the Saudi government placed weapons orders in the United
States for $23.5 billion for its ground forces. The Saudis
also plan to spend $4 billion for 72 F-15 fighter jets."* On
September 14, 1992 the Bush administration formally notified
the Congress that it intended to sell the F-15s to Saudi
Arabia. The proposed sale, which will provide 10,000 jobs, was
expected to be approved by Congress before the November
elections , 89
Yahya Sadowski contends that the Saudi build-up after the
war has triggered an arms bazaar amongst states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council:
Saudi Arabia's project has undermined hopes for arms
control programs for the region as a whole. The smaller
Arab Gulf states were naturally alarmed and eagerly began
enlarging their own armed forces. US Secretary of Defense
Richard Cheney returned from a Gulf states tour in May
1991 with orders for over 200 Apache attack helicopters,
almost 400 Abrams tanks, and nearly 1000 Bradley fighting
vehicles. Arms procurement officials from the Gulf states
swamped the Le Bourget and Dubai Air Shows in the fall of
1991 to bid on aircraft like the Tornado, the (F-15) Eagle
and the (F/A-18) Hornet; on helicopters such as the
Gazelle and the Apache; and on munitions such as the GBU-
*Sadowski, p. 11
89Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. and Israel Working Out Deal To
Offset Warplane Sale to Saudis," The New York Times , 15 Sep
92, p. A-6.
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28 "burrowing bomb." Kuwait decided to double the size of
its airforce and the 1991-92 Kuwaiti budget called for a
six-fold increase of defense spending, rising to 43.4% of
its total budget .... Iran will feel similar pressures to
increase its military spending . 90
In the summer of 1992 Kuwait announced plans to buy 236
American-made main battle tanks. The sale of these state-of-
the-art MI-A2s, including spare parts, training, and
ammunition could total about $4 billion. The M1-A2 is an
improved version of the Abrams Ml-Al tank which performed so
magnificently in Desert Storm. The M1-A2 won out over the
British Challenger tank during combat trials in the Kuwaiti
desert. The Bush administration, enmeshed in a closely
contested election campaign, strongly supported the sale of
the American-made tanks to the Kuwaitis. The deal was expected
to encounter little resistance in Congress. One Pentagon
official, remarking on the unusually strong administration
support, commented "Mind you, though, if there were ever a
country over which to exercise a certain leverage, it was
Kuwait." The UAE has expressed interest in purchasing 390 new
tanks and the M1-A2, scheduled to undergo desert trials there
in the fall of 1992, was considered to have an inside edge in
that competition as well. Kuwait, which is seeking to spread
military equipment contracts and reconstruction projects among
the members of the coalition which liberated their country in
1991 as a way of repaying its war debts, was expected to




select the British Warrior over the American Bradley fighting
vehicle. 91
Iran has hardly been standing idly by while the other Gulf
states have been beefing up their conventional arsenals.
Norman Friedman reported that in July 1992 Iran struck a $2 .
5
billion deal with the Russian aircraft industry. The sale was
the largest to date for Russian aircraft exporters and
included 12 TU-22M Backfires for the bargain basement price of
under $100 million each. These highly sophisticated aircraft
had never before been exported outside of Russia. In addition
to the Backfires "(T)he package also included 24 MiG-3 1
interceptors (with 2 Mainstay airborne radar-control
aircraft), 48 MiG-29 air-superiority fighters, and 24 MiG-27
ground-attack fighters, plus a variety of surface-to-air
missile batteries (long-range, fixed-site SA-5s and SA-11 and
SA-13 mobile weapons) ." Additionally, the Russians have agreed
to assist Iran in the rehabilitation of "the large fleet of
ex-Iraqi aircraft that fell into Iranian hands during the Gulf
War. " 92
Friedman speculated that the package "almost certainly
includes AS-6 antiship missiles." He described the
characteristics of the AS-6 as follows:
91 Eric Schmitt, "Kuwaitis Will Buy Tanks Made In U.S.,"
New York Times , 13 Oct 92, pp. A-l, C-5.
92Norman Friedman, "Iranian Air Threat Emerging," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings , September 1992, p. 123.
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The AS-6 is a fast, steep-diving missile, that can be
fired from well beyond a (naval) battle group's
antiaircraft envelope; it was in part responsible for
stimulating intense U.S. Navy interest in what came to be
called the outer air battle. Given the geography of the
Persian Gulf, the AS-6 could be launched at a target
anywhere in the Gulf by an Iranian Backfire flying in its
own air space. No Gulf navy has anything remotely like the
sort of long-range defensive missile reguired to provide
defense in depth against such a weapon. 43
Friedman concluded the article by speculating on the post-
Cold War naval air threat:
After all, who but the ex-Soviets would challenge us
with exotica such as the Backfires and long-range antiship
missiles?
Now we have a possible answer. The Iranians may not
consider our (U.S.) carriers the likely targets of their
weapons, but it now seems clearer that they want to be
able to dominate the Persian Gulf. The Backfires and the
Kilo-class submarines announce that intention. Moreover,
the Backfire sale is likely to be repeated elsewhere. 94
The Pentagon has announced that Iran is purchasing two or
three Kilo-class submarines from Russia. Iran will become the
first Persian Gulf nation to possess modern diesel-electric
submarines. The acquisition by Iran of the Kilos is
particularly worrisome to regional naval planners. According
to a New York Times report, the U.S. Navy has said "the
Iranian submarines will introduce a new threat to naval
operations in the sea lanes of the Persian Gulf and the
Arabian Sea, which carry much of the world's oil." A senior
93Ibid.
94Ibid, p. 124 (emphasis added)
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Pentagon official elaborated on the gravity of the submarine
transfer
:
This will introduce a significant kind of warfare that has
been absent from the region. When you look at the
countries around the Persian Gulf, you could end up with
some kind of domino effect.'1'''
Iran is reportedly paying $250 million tor each ot the
Kilos. This price is very reasonable for a submarine of the
Kilo's capabilities. Diesel-electric submarines have limited
speed and endurance when compared to nuclear powered subs.
However, in the confined water space of the Persian and
Arabian Gulf littorals, the Kilo should prove to be a potent
force multiplier. Whether operating in an antiship or in a
mine-laying role, the stealthy Kilo will certainly complicate
regional naval planning. 46 The Kilo's potential to close the
'''Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Selling 2 or 3 Submarines to
Tehran's Navy, Worrying U.S.," New York Times , 24 Sep 92, p.
A-6.
96See: Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Sub Checks Gulf's Waters
With Iran in Mind," New York Times , 5 Nov 92, p. A-3. This
article reported on the first deployment of a nuclear-powered
submarine into the Persian Gulf. The article cites an
anonymous senior Defense Department official as saying that
the Iran's purchase of the Kilo was an "important
consideration in the Pentagon's decision" to send in the U.S.
sub. The article also reports of U.S. Navy concerns with the
Kilo sale:
The Russian sale of submarines worries the United States
Navy, which says the Iranian submarines will introduce a
new threat to naval operations in the Persian Gulf and the
Arabian Sea. When operating on batteries below the
surface, diesel submarines are extremely quiet and
difficult to detect. And the Navy is concerned that the
move will encourage other countries in the area to
purchase submarines.
Washington repeatedly asked Moscow not to proceed with
the sale, but the Russian Government rejected the American
49
Strait of Hormuz is taken very seriously by maritime
strategists. 47 Control of this vital choke point will be
crucial in any future regional conflict. The addition of Kilos
into Iran's inventory will skew the naval balance of power, on
both the tactical and operational levels, in the Gulf. 9*
Russian arms sales to Iran will likely continue to be a
sore spot in their still emerging post-Cold War relationship
with the United States. 44 In addition to the submarines,
protests, saying it was obliged to honor the arms
contracts and needed the money.
97See: Anwar Faruqi, "U.S. to Monitor Iranian Sub in
Gulf," Associated Press report in The Monterey County Herald ,
6 Nov 92, p. 14A.
But submarines based in the gulf could operate just
outside the Strait of Hormuz in the far deeper waters of
the Arabian Sea. About 20 percent of the world's oil
supply moves through the strait.
The U.S. naval command has tried to play down the
significance of the (USS) Topeka ' s arrival in the gulf
Sunday. But there is little doubt that Iran's purchase of
two diesel-electric submarines has worried Washington.
This is the first time the Navy has acknowledged putting
a submarine in the gulf. It has declined to say whether
U.S. submarines have ever operated secretly in the gulf.
98See: "Iran Commissions First Gulf Sub," Associated Press
report in The Monterey County Herald , 24 Nov 92, p. 2A.
Iran yesterday commissioned the Persian Gulf's first
submarine, tilting the region's balance of naval power.
Tehran has been spending billions on weapons and is
reviving its revolutionary militancy, (emphasis added)
"See: Roger Cohen, "West Will Expand High-Tech Sales,"
New York Times , 25 Nov 92, p. A-5. This article examines post-
Desert Storm proliferation trends:
Proliferation has become a highly sensitive issue in
both Europe and Washington since the West's failure to
detect the scale of Iraq's nuclear program. In recent
weeks, the Bush Administration has expressed deep concern
over sales of militarily useful equipment and technology
to Iran - including fighter aircraft, bombers, submarines
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aircraft, and missiles, Russia agreed in September 1992 to
sell two 440-megawatt nuclear reactors to Iran. While the
Russians insist that the reactors will only be used for
peaceful purposes, the United States remains wary, given
Iran's track record and public declarations. Referring to the
submarine sale, naval expert Norman Polmar commented:
What it all means is that the Russians will sell anything
to anybody to earn hard currency and to keep production
lines going. It also shows that Iran again wants to be a
regional power. m
and tanks from the former Soviet Union.
American officials said they met with a 12-member
Russian delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister
Grigory V. Berdennikov. In the talks, Mr. (Alan) Larson
(head of the United States delegation) said the Russians
"recognize that their export control regime is not
adequate and that there is a serious problem with
sensitive technologies, and they expressed an extreme
willingness to work with us."
100Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Selling 2 or 3 Submarines to
Teheran's Navy, Worrying U.S.," The New York Times , 24 Sep 92,
p. A-6.Ibid (emphasis added). See also: Michael R. Gordon,
"Cash-strapped Russia selling arms to China," New York Times ,
18 Oct 92. This article quotes Richard F Grimmett, an expert
on the conventional arms trade at the Congressional Research
Service:
The Russian focus is on those countries that are willing
to pay cash. There is a tremendous focus on Iran...
(emphasis added)
This article speculates that Russian arms sold to China could
be reverse engineered, and that the Chinese versions of the
Soviet weapons would end up being exported to Third World
nations.
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D. OTHER ARMS PROLIFERATION DEVELOPMENTS
Despite hope that the successful conclusion of Operation
Desert Storm would bring about a lower level of militarization
in the Gulf region, there are strong indications that the
regional arms race has, in fact, accelerated. Heightened
distrust of Gulf neighbors amongst themselves, coupled with a
world-wide economic slowdown have fueled the regional military
build-up. A cash-starved Russia has made it clear to the world
that it will trade sophisticated arms for hard currency. 101
The lingering recession in the United States has made the
export of arms, one of the few manufacturing sectors in which
10INorman Friedman, "It's Dangerous Out There...," Naval
Institute Proceedings , October 1992, pp. 122-4. Friedman made
the following observations concerning the availability of
Russian arms on the world market:
Whoever has the cash will get excellent eguipment . . . .Hard
cash is what the Russian aerospace industry now needs, and
it is offering some very impressive eguipment at low
prices. U.S. manufacturers may argue that our own support
is far better, and that we are probably also better at
subtleties as such as electronic counter-countermeasures.
The Russian weapons are certainly far beyond what some of
our Western competitors are selling, however, and, like
our competitors, the Russians seem unlikely to impose any
sort of political litmus test on the buyer.
See also: Michael R. Gordon, "Cash-strapped Russia selling
arms to China," New York Times . 18 Oct 92. This report further
amplifies the Russian need for convertible currency:
What the Russians are after now is cash, not influence.
That, plus the Iragi defeat in the Persian Gulf war, which
effectively removed it as a potential client, has limited
the number of prospective customers. Two of the major
customers are now Iran and China (emphasis added)
.
The report quotes a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman's
justification for the sale of arms to Iran: "Russia cannot in
principle, taking into account the economic situation in this
country, give up the receipts of freely convertible currency
through the sale of arms abroad."
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the United States is still globally competitive, particularly
attractive to politicians seeking reelection. An additional
consideration must be the huge stockpiles of weapons which
will be made redundant with the implementation of the treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) . Signatories to CFE may
seek to dump their excess weapons on the world market at "fire
sale" prices. One can be relatively certain that some of the
CFE excess will find its way into the Gulf region. lu2
Yahya Sadowski, a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution, makes the case that American schemes to control
arms levels in the Gulf were poorly conceived and executed:
The Bush arms control proposal of May 1991 proved poorly
designed to catalyze Arab interest in arms control.
Instead of loosely linking arms control and the peace
process, so that progress in either sphere would encourage
advances in the other, the Bush administration had
sequenced them so that serious arms control concessions
could only become practicable after a breakthrough in the
peace talks.
If the Bush initiative constructed too strong a linkage
between arms control and the peace process, it posited too
weak a linkage between arms control and regional security
in the Gulf. The question of arms control apparently never
came up during the talks between Washington (represented
by the Pentagon, not the State Department) and Riyadh
about the defense of Saudi Arabia. American negotiators,
eager to acquire right to bases or at least to preposition
military hardware in the kingdom, consistently tried to
"sweeten the deal" by offering to sell the Saudis advanced
102Ibid, p. 124. Friedman makes the case that the post-
Cold War arms market has changed dramatically:
The end of the Cold War has made equipment available
wholesale, without any political dickering. Mass
demobilization has made trained personnel available on a
similar scale. Thus money can equal instant force
structure. Strategic warning time can shrink from decades
to months.
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weapons systems. They made similar offers to Kuwait,
Bahrain and the UAE. 103
Whether the Bush post-war arms control and regional
security schemes were poorly conceived or not, the fact
remains that the flow of arms into the region continues more
or less unimpeded. Given the fact that U.S. forces may once
again have to fight in the region to protect national
interests, it behooves the planner to monitor the level and
quality of armaments present in the potential theater of
operations. If successful campaigns are to be conducted in the
event of a major regional contingency, it is imperative that
we have an accurate picture of the potential enemies' relative
and absolute strengths.
The transparency of the arms trade in the post-Cold War
period somewhat simplifies the intelligence collection efforts
required to construct accurate orders of battle of potential
adversaries. This "enemies list", which will require frequent
revisions, must include nations which display open hostility
to the United States and those with the potential of doing so
in the future. United Nations efforts to further increase arms
trade transparency will assist the intelligence community in
assessing enemy strengths and weaknesses. 104 Additionally,
103Yahya Sadowski, "Scuds versus Butter," pp. 11-12.
104
"Security Council Summit Declaration: 'New Risks for
Stability and Security,'" (Text of the declaration issued at
the Security Council summit meeting at the United Nations on
31 Jan 92). New York Times , 1 Feb 92, p. A-4 . This declaration
states: "On conventional armaments, they note the General
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the decline of the threat from the former Soviet Union allows
intelligence efforts, both space-based and on the ground, to
be refocused away from the traditional enemy and towards other
potential trouble spots. This freeing up of scarce
intelligence resources can offer the planner a more detailed
snapshot of the field of battle than was available at the
height of the East-West conflict. 105
As more weapons which were formerly unavailable to
American buyers are openly traded on the international arms
market, it is in the United States* interest to purchase
weapons that it could conceivably face in combat and test them
under realistic battlefield conditions. These operational
tests and evaluations would assist the strategist and
Assembly's vote in favor of a register of arms transfers as a
first step, and in this connection recognize the importance of
all states providing all the information called for in the
General Assembly's resolution."
105Another option is to sell intelligence-gathering
satellites to U.S. allies abroad. See: William J. Broad, "3
Nations Seek to Buy Spy Satellites, Causing Policy Rift in
U.S.," New York Times , 23 Nov 92, p. A-4 . In this report, the
case is put forward that the United States should be very
selective about the nations to which it makes available such
high-tech spy craft:
Dr. Hans Mark, a former director of the National
Reconnaissance Office at the Pentagon, which develops and
operates the nation's spy satellites, said in an interview
that the spread of such satellites could ease tensions
around by substituting realistic appraisals for military
speculation. But he said the United States should pick its
customers carefully.
"We need to differentiate between the Irans of the world
and the South Koreas". Dr. Mark said, "Any nation that
puts a price on the head of an author is not civilized,




tactician in planning effective counter-measures to anticipated
threat scenarios. Additionally, computer simulation of the
weapons in hostilities can provide a cost-effective method of
training U.S. forces in an austere budgetary environment.
While computer simulations can never completely replace fleet
and field exercises, they do offer a cheaper alternative to
the hefty operations and maintenance (O&MN) costs associated
with training maneuvers. Basing future programming decisions
on specific, vice generic, threats could also save scarce
defense budget dollars in R&D and procurement accounts. As the
defense budget continues its downward "glide slope" in the
1990s, innovative and low cost alternatives to the traditional
methods of preparing for war become essential.
The voracious demand for arms in the Gulf region shows no
sign of diminishing any time soon. It must be assumed that
suppliers will continue to meet demand. This is especially
true given the spread of free-market capitalism into the
formerly-communist lands. American efforts to halt, or at
least control, the flow of arms into the region have met with
limited success. As America itself continues to rearm its
friends and allies in the region, it necessarily surrenders
the moral high ground in preaching restraint in the inter-
regional arms market. This dilemma facing the United States
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must be resolved if it is to maintain its influence in the
region. i06
E. U.S. ARMS TRANSFER POLICY OPTIONS
The United States has three obvious policy options in
dealing with this dilemma. First, it could unilaterally cease
its own arms transfers to the region and hope that the rest of
the world follows suit. This is an extremely risky proposition
given the fact that the former Warsaw Pact nations and those
nations still espousing communist ideology (China, North
Korea, etc.) are fiscally strapped. Arms sales offer these
nations one of the few readily available sources of hard
currency. Expecting these arms suppliers to be shamed into
following any noble example set by the United States is
probably unrealistic. Also, given the recent U.S. arms sales
106See: William J. Broad, "Concern Raised as Emirates Seek
Spy Satellite From U.S.," New York Times , 17 Nov 92, p. A-10.
This article (about the possible sale of a U.S. reconnaissance
satellite to the U.A.E.) succinctly frames the cost-benefit
issues inherent in selling high-tech arms sales to allies:
"The dilemma," said John E. Pike, head of space policy
at the Federation of American Scientists, a private
Washington group, "is how to promote exports and American
jobs without creating new military threats abroad. It's
going to be one of the most challenging issues of the
decade .
"
A Federal official, who spoke on the condition of
anonymity, said the Government was carefully considering
the risks and benefits of the proposed (satellite) sale,
which might run to several hundred million dollars.
"There are a number of folks who are not opposed to this
kind of thing in principle," the official said. "But it's
situational. It depends on which country, the conditions
of sale and a number of related factors bearing on the
security of the United States."
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to its clients in the region 107
,
it is unlikely that other
suppliers would see such a move as anything but a hypocritical
attempt by the United States to shore up a favorable shift in
the status quo antebellum. 108
Secondly, the United States could seek to establish a
multilateral framework to control arms sales to the Gulf
states. Given recent U.N. initiatives to monitor arms
transfers and the unprecedented level of superpower
cooperation seen in the Security Council during the Gulf War,
this avenue would seem to offer a somewhat better chance for
success than any unilateral action by the United States.
However, economic factors would seem to mitigate against the
realization a "leak-proof" regime. Once again, it is probably
unlikely that any cash starved country would voluntarily give
up a source of income that, at least in the minds of their
leaders, upon which their national survival depends.
107Michael R. Gordon, "Cash-strapped Russia selling arms
to China," New York Times , 18 Oct 92:
Administration officials say that the Russians would be
selling weapons to Iran and China regardless of American
sales (of combat aircraft to Taiwan and Saudi Arabia) . But
Russian officials have cited such deals to justify their
exports.
108
"How to Slow the Slaughter," New York Times , 16 Oct 92,
p. A-18. This editorial portrays the arms embargo in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as one which serves to reinforce an unfavorable
status quo. It argues that an arms embargo in the Yugoslavian
case is contrary to U.S. interests:
The Serbs and others have all the arms they need, and can
circumvent the embargo to get more. The present embargo
disarms only Bosnia. The U.S. can persuade the Security
Council to drop the embargo, then help arm the Bosnians
with big guns to resist aggression.
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The spotty record of success seen thus far in enforcing
the mandates of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) would seem to
give credence to the notion that multilateral arms control
schemes have yet to reach a level of maturity that would offer
much hope of success in the near-term. A strong argument can
be made that an effort should at least be made to institute a
multilateral plan. The basis of such an argument is that in
setting up and attempting to enforce a multilateral arms
control plan, valuable lessons could be learned and applied to
similar ventures in the future. However, given the history of
past failures coupled with current global financial
circumstances, the likelihood of success would appear to be
too low to warrant serious U.S. consideration.
The third option is for the United States to continue to
arm its regional friends and allies in an attempt to maintain
a favorable balance of power that deters future conflict. This
approach is attractive for two reasons. First, it ensures that
nations friendly to American interests remain regional powers,
whether they are involved in a collective security arrangement
tacitly allied with the U.S. or they go it alone. It is never
a bad idea to have powerful friends (that are indebted to you)
when you are forced to do business in a dangerous
neighborhood.
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F. DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND U.S. ARMS TRANSFER POLICY
The strategy discussed above, of course, is anathema to
those who espouse the unfettered promotion of democratic
governments above all else in U.S. foreign policy. Our friends
in the Gulf region are unlikely to fully embrace participatory
democracy any time soon, regardless of whether or not we
supply them with arms. 109 A policy of arming nations with
interests similar to ours (regional stability, unimpeded
freedom of navigation, free market pricing of commodities,
etc,) makes sense irrespective of political persuasion. The
ultimate goal of the democratization of Gulf nations is a
long-term venture. If our friends in the Gulf are able, with
U.S. assistance, to maintain a robust level of national and
regional security, thereby assuaging fear of an attack by
would-be regional hegemons, they can be gently but
persistently prodded to undertake democratic reforms. 110 The
109Jack Anderson and Michael Binstein, "Kuwaitis Find
Selves at a Loss Without Bush," The Monterey County Herald , 27
Nov 92, p. 14A. This article notes that democratic reforms are
occurring, however slowly, in post-Desert Storm Kuwait:
Realizing that Bush had been prodded and pushed during the
(election) campaign about Kuwait's lack of democracy, many
were determined to make reinstatement of the National
Assembly a harbinger of their nascent democracy, and a
repose to the rest of the world. It was also a chance to
deliver a kind of October surprise to the embattled
president - something he could point to with
accomplishment in the first week of October. . . .But despite
their best efforts to support Bush, right down to
showcasing of free and fair elections, the president lost.
110See: Benjamin C. Schwarz, "Morality Is No Mantra," New
York Times , 20 Nov 92, p. A-19. Schwarz offers the following
pragmatic advice to the incoming Clinton administration:
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use of arms sales to states in the region allows the United
States to: 1) wield significant political influence in the
target state(s) and; 2) ensure that the regional balance of
power is one that is conducive to the protection of U.S.
national interests.
Democracies are not built overnight, as the nations of
Eastern Europe are finding out. The United States should
gently nurture a shift from autocracy to democracy in the
region while ensuring a favorable correlation of forces.
Granted, this approach could be fraught with danger.
Ultimately, skillful diplomacy 1 " should be able to achieve
the desired results (democratic reforms) while protecting
American economic and security interests during the transition
period. This approach is not without recent precedents.
Rather than pursue the dream of ordering and
democratizing the globe, Mr. Clinton should remember that
foreign policy primarily serves defense, not ambitions of
greatness. It would not be neo-isolationist but realism
for him to urge Americans to accept foreign policy's
modest but difficult task of enabling us to survive and
prosper in the world as it exist. Its purpose is not to
transform global politics, nor to change men's hearts, nor
to busy ourselves with the alleged cause of mankind.
ulThe author assumes, perhaps generously, that the United
States is capable of skillful and sagacious regional
diplomacy. The post-Cold War shift in focus outlined in The
National Military Strategy of the United States bodes well for
future regional diplomatic and military efforts:
Because of the changes in the strategic environment, the
threats we expect to face are regional rather than global.
We will, of course, deter and defend against strategic
nuclear attacks as we have for the past forty
years. .. .However , our plans and resources are primarily
focused on deterring and fighting regional rather than
global wars. (p. 11, emphasis added)
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Nicaragua and the Philippines are moderately successful
examples of the two-pronged approach. Granted, these two
nation's paths toward democratic reform were far from
obstacle-free. Many serious problems, both internal and
external, had to be overcome during the painful transition.
However, with the benefit of these recent experiences, the
United States should be able to assist the GCC states in
avoiding many of the pitfalls commonly encountered in the
transition to democracy.
The second attraction of the strategy of ensuring that our
regional friends remain powerful is economic. As previously
mentioned, arms sales offer the United States a lucrative
export market. The success of American technology in Operation
Desert Storm ensured that the world market for high technology
weapons will remain firm. Even with top-shelf Russian arms
becoming freely available on the open the market, most nations
would rather purchase the combat-proven American systems that
carried the Gulf War, if given the choice. The stagnant U.S.
economy needs robust arms exports for several reasons; to
improve the balance of trade, to retain perishable defense
contracting skills (highly-skilled labor, defense engineering,
defense-oriented research and development, management, etc.)
,
and to preserve the defense industrial base in the period of
the U.S. defense reductions.
As the Department of Defense begins placing fewer orders
for weapons and other military equipment, there exists the
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danger that certain defense contractors (some of whom would be
absolutely critical to the nation's security in wartime) could
convert exclusively to civilian production. Once converted to
civilian production, these firms would be hard-pressed to
reconstitute their defense-related capabilities in a surge to
war.
A solution to this problem would be to allow these firms
to compete, with limited restrictions 112
,
for overseas defense
contracts. This solution offers several benefits. It enables
the United States to retain its defense industrial-base, which
is the envy of the world. At the same time it saves defense
industries the (not insignificant) expenses involved in a
substantial conversion to civilian production. While it is
unlikely that foreign orders will completely make up for the
loss of major U.S. military contracts, this solution offers
the opportunity for the nation to retain a sizeable portion of
its defense industrial base at a minimum cost to both defense
industries and the federal government. The counter-argument
posits that the United States has surrendered enough civilian
n2A totally free market approach to arms sales is clearly
unacceptable. There must be some government control over arms
transfers to prevent, for example, the sale of domestically
produced weapons to a nation openly hostile to American
interests. In any loosening of the restrictions on the arms
trade, the government and industry must work hand-in-glove to
ensure that their respective interests are protected. The
government's interests are primarily concerned with national
security, an expanding economy, and ideological matters.
Defense contractors must balance the profit motive with larger
security concerns. Japan's MITI offers a model for government-
industry cooperation in attempting to attain common goals.
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industry to overseas competition already, and we will never
recoup these losses if we continue to concentrate our efforts
in military production. This argument is analogous to closing
the barn door after the horses have escaped. While the United
States could conceivably recapture some of the civilian
markets it has already lost, the question must be whether or
not a massive effort to regain all the lost markets is a wise
pursuit given the current economic health of our major
competitors? It probably would make economic sense to concede,
for example, the lion's share of the consumer electronics
industry to Japan. No amount of government intervention is
likely to win back this industry. Instead the United States
should seek to cut its losses in those civilian industries
where it is clearly behind its overseas competitors.
This is not meant to imply that the United States should
completely sacrifice the high ground in the high-tech consumer
goods battlefield. The United States should seek to position
itself to take advantage of its massive research and
development infrastructure, and aggressively market products
which utilize cutting-edge technologies. With the lessening of
East-West tensions, the United States should reorient its R &
D efforts to accommodate the new strategic realities. In the
post-Cold War world economic strength and diversity could well
replace military might as the key characteristic of a
superpower nation. The United States should seek to nurture
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In developing and marketing high technology weapons for
export to its allies, the United States should, naturally,
avoid overreliance on arms production as an engine for
economic growth. Even given the assumption that a market for
high tech arms will always be there, the United States must
never be solely an arms merchant. The United States should
seek to maintain a diverse economic foundation, which can
swiftly bring to world markets those goods which incorporate
new technologies and manufacturing processes, so that it can
adapt to any likely contingency. In the event of an outbreak
" 3See: Frank Gibney, "The Selling of What America Should
Be Keeping," New York Times , 30 Oct 92, p. B-10. This review
of Martin and Susan J. Tolchin's book Selling Our Security:
The Erosion of America's Assets , examines the changing
security environment and the role that economics plays in the
national defense:
"None of America's major trading partners," they (the
Tolchins) write, "subscribes to the U.S. vision of free
trade. None regard technology with a cavalier notion that
ownership doesn't matter - unless they are the owners.
Instead, each nurtures technologies it deems vital to its
economic competitiveness in the 21st century."
With this as their starting point, the Tolchins go on to
show first how American policy makers' trust in a global
economy - still piously believed to be based on the laws
of comparative advantage - has sacrificed national
security considerations to the point where much of our
leading technology in the Persian Gulf war, for example
was dependent on foreign suppliers. But the problem
transcends mere defense concerns. In the post-cold war
world, it is almost impossible to disentangle a nation's
security from a strong and technology-oriented economy,
whether or not the connection with actual defense needs is
a direct one.
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of peace, the United States must have several fall back
positions to ensure its continued economic prosperity.
G. CONCLUSION
While the strategy outlined above for dealing with arms
proliferation in the Persian Gulf region may seem overly
defeatist to arms control advocates, it is based on economic-
strategic pragmatism. The goal of reducing arsenals, both
regionally and globally, is certainly a worthy one. However,
when faced with the practical realities described above, the
United States cannot afford to take a holier-than-thou stance
if it expects to protect its regional interests.
The United States must aggressively pursue both
economic 114 and strategic 115 security as the most pressing of
national priorities if it expects to compete in the new world
order. While the United States can participate in and
114See: Frank Gibney, "The Selling of What America Should
Be Keeping," New York Times , 30 Oct 92, p. B-10. This review
makes the case that the definition of national security should
be broadened
:
Actually from the 1950' s and 60 's on, Americans thought
of defense in very broad terms. Building roads, improving
education and developing technology were all part of
building up the national defense posture. But with the
80's. . .the definition of what was actually security shrank
to a narrow, strictly military perimeter. Even in military
applications, the idea of keeping a certain amount of
technological productivity in this country was often
sacrificed to a totally uncritical definition of global
interdependence
.
115See: "National Security, Redefined," New York Times
(editorial), p. A-14.
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contribute to measures designed to lower regional tensions,
including arras control, it must always be prepared to fight
and win should deterrence fail. Prudence dictates using
American arms to shape the strategic environment in the Gulf.
The added bonus of reaping domestic economic benefits while at
the same time preserving the national defense industrial base
further militates against a hasty cutback in the supply of
American arms to our friends in the region.
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IV. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT" 6
A. INTRODUCTION
The primary reason for the United States' interest in the
Persian Gulf region lies in its economic importance to the
industrial nations of the world. The region supplies over half
of the oil supplies for the economies of Western Europe and
Japan and provides a significant portion of U.S. oil imports.
The importance of unimpeded oil supplies to support Western
economies has been demonstrated repeatedly during the last
twenty years. The impact of the 1973 oil embargo, and the
economic influence of OPEC in the 1970s provide two excellent
examples. The United States has repeatedly stated its
commitment to unrestricted access to the Gulf as demonstrated
by the ref lagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1987, and the
United States' reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
1990.
During the Cold War, the Persian Gulf region was
frequently mentioned as a possible site for superpower
conflict. Additionally, the United States remained the
principal supporter of the state of Israel. This situation put
ll6The author is indebted to the following U.S. Navy
officers for their assistance in formulating the scenarios in
this chapter: LCDR Sam Perez. LCDR Pat Brady, Lt Hamp All, LT
Ken Szczublewski, LT Jim Pitts, and LT Brian Howes.
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the United States in the unique position of arms supplier to
the Arab countries of the region to counter Soviet influence,
while at the same time being the arms supplier to the state of
Israel to counter Arab threats to its existence. Now that the
Cold War has ended and the Arabs and Jews are at least sitting
together at the negotiating table, the strategic context for
U.S. involvement in the region has been altered. Yet at the
same time the need for uninterrupted oil supplies remains, and
as a result the United States cannot nor should not abandon
the region altogether.
The scenarios developed for this section concern
themselves only with the nations which actually border the
Persian Gulf littoral. The states considered include; Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E., and Oman
(note: the last six states on this list also comprise the
entire membership of the GCC) . It must be emphasized that
these scenarios do not consider the entire Middle East region
(e.g. Israel, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, etc.). There are a three
reasons for not examinihg the entire Middle Eastern sector in
this analysis.
First, the author believes that with the end of the Cold
War, coupled with the election a Labor government in Israel,
the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict has entered a new,
and potentially less dangerous, stage. The likelihood of an
Arab-Israeli conflict escalating into nuclear war between the
United States and the C.I.S. is considered practically nil
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given recent events. The former Soviet military empire has
crumbled. Political leaders in what remains of the empire
would be loathe to endanger national survival to engage in a
regional conflict. It is practically inconceivable that Russia
or any of the former Soviet republics would mount a militarily
significant Middle Eastern campaign given the economic and
social chaos in these fledgling democracies. Now that the
Arabs and Israelis can no longer play the role of proxy agents
in the greater East-West struggle, there is considerably more
impetus for the two parties to reach a negotiated settlement
to their hostilities.
The second factor for excluding nations other than those
which border the Gulf has to do with the anticipated deterrent
effect of Israeli nuclear weapons. Recent accounts credit
Israeli with having as many as 200 nuclear devices." 7 For the
present, at least, the Israelis enjoy a nuclear monopoly in
the region. Although both Iraq and Iran have ambitious nuclear
weapons programs, it is unlikely that either nation will reach
anything resembling nuclear parity with Israel within the next
twenty years. The only conceivable manner in which the Arab
states could mount a credible nuclear threat to the Jewish
State, at least in the short- to medium- term, would be to
acquire a large quantity of advanced nuclear weapons from a
third party or parties. Given the breakup of the former Soviet
117Leonard S. Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the
Middle East," Orbis , Spring 1992, p. 193.
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Union and the resultant decentralization of Moscow's control
over that nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, this possibility
cannot be ignored nor discounted. However, if the safeguards
provisions of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (HPT) are
made more stringent and strictly enforced, a reasonable
assumption in the wake of the discovery of Iraq's substantial
nuclear programs after the 1991 war, this disposition of
former-Soviet nuclear v/eapons can probably be avoided. It is
the author's opinion that the reality of Israel's nuclear
advantage, coupled with the rather dismal Arab military
performances in their previous wars against the Jewish State,
will deter another Arab-Israeli conflict in the short- to
medium-term. Another deterrent to Arab-Jew hostilities is the
American security commitment to Israel.
The final factor for limiting the scope of this analysis
to Persian Gulf states is oil. Since the non-Persian Gulf
nations of the Middle East do not possess significant (at
least in Gulf terms) oil reserves, nor do they have access to
them, it is unlikely that they will play a direct role in
affecting future U.S. economic interests in the region. Oil is
the lifeblood of modern capitalism. A lack of this vital
resource, and the potential to use it as a bargaining chip,
necessarily lessens any nation's influence among the economic
powerhouses of the developed world.
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The importance of Gulf oil to the West in general, and the
United States in particular, is made apparent in the following
excerpt
:
A core of Gulf oil exporters is thus pivotal for the
supply of oil to the world economy. This is a key reason
for Washington's intervention in the Kuwait crisis. In
addition to the increasing dependence of major consuming
countries on the oil deposits in the area, important
ideological and practical affinities between Gulf
monarchies and the West make that reliance tolerable.
Faced with rising oil import dependence, the Bush
administration has made a strategic decision in favor of
shoring up its Gulf allies militarily even while opposing
policies at home that would constrain the American
appetite for energy.
These countries-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United
Arab Emirates-have by far the most extensive oil reserves
in the world, rivaled only by Iraq and Iran, and the
ability to expand production capacities to meet growing
world demand .
In broad terms, then, it would appear that the United
States has but two plausible courses of action available to
deal with its dependence on Gulf oil supplies. The first and
most obvious, reducing demand for oil in the United States, is
an expensive and long-term proposition. Additionally, recent
U.S. energy policy has given little indication that decreasing
reliance on foreign oil is taken seriously as a long-range
planning goal. Expanded U.S. oil production is not likely in
the near-term given the current and anticipated environmental,
economic, and political conditions. Assuming, then, that
America's love affair with petroleum will continue into the
" 8Paul Aarts and Michael Renner, "Oil and the Gulf War,"
Middle East Report . July-August 1991, p. 26 (emphasis added).
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future, the goal of U.S. policy must be to shape the strategic
environment in the Gulf region into a form amenable to U.S.
national interests. "Shaping" operations, almost by
definition, have to involve foresight and a proactive U.S.
policy in regional affairs and diplomacy. Rather than putting
out fires, as the United States has been wont to do in the
past, U.S. policy should seek to prevent combustion in the
tinder box, which the Gulf region surely is, in the first
place
.
The regional deterrence strategy outlined in the National
Military Strategy of the United States would appear to offer
planners an excellent framework on which to base future
regional military operations:
By examining and anticipating the potential for
instability or crisis, the regional CINCs develop plans
for the employment of military assets (as well as
examining the complementary economic, diplomatic, and
political options). These options, used singly or in
various combinations, can be carried out with the intent
of deterring or averting crisis. They vary widely from
large joint and combined operations and the deployment of
task forces to small mobile training teams and low level
military to military contacts. Forward presence
forces... are fundamental to this concept." 9
Forward military presence is, of course, but one way to
shape the regional environment. The "complementary economic,
diplomatic, and political options" are equally important
shaping tools. Arms sales to allies, as discussed in the
previous chapter, offer a means for the United States to
" 9National Military Strategy of the United States ,
January 1992, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), p. 12.
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signal commitment to regional stability as well as ensuring a
balance of power favorable to its national interests, in both
geo-strategic and economic terms. The National Military
Strategy of the United States acknowledges that the use of
military force will frequently be the option of last resort:
"Prior to committing U.S. forces to combat it must be
determined that U.S. vital interests are at risk and that
political, diplomatic, and economic measures have failed to
correct the situation or have been ruled out for some other
reason . " l20
The intention in formulating the following scenarios is to
attempt to anticipate plausible futures, and then to chart
possible U.S. strategies to shape the future regional
environment to its desires by means short of combat. The
common underlying factors which would appear to contribute to
tension in the Gulf region are: 1) ethnic and religious
differences (e.g. Arab-Persian, Sunni-Shi ' ite) ; 2) oil
production disputes (or disputes between haves and have-nots)
;
3) Islamic fundamentalism (or Islamism) ; and 4) U.S. political
and military influence in the region.
The key religious differences associated with the region
involve the split between the Sunni and Shia factions of the
Islamic faith. Sunni is the predominant faction in the region,
however Iran embraces Shi 'ism and this, in addition to ethnic
''"Ibid, p. 15.
74
differences, fuels much of the discord between Iran and the
other Gulf states. The region of Iraq closest to the Persian
Gulf waterway contains a significant Shia population . ::i This
presents an important factor in determining the possibility of
future conflicts in the region, especially if a new government
were to supplant the Baathist regime in Baghdad.
Oil production disputes are not uncommon to the region.
Iraq invaded Kuwait based in part on the pretense that Kuwait
was producing too much oil and thus depriving Iraq of much
needed oil revenues. This issue is also related to the tension
between the haves and have-nots in the region. Iran and Iraq,
by having the largest populations, consider themselves to be
less fortunate that the other Gulf states, and thus have a
general disdain for the opulent lifestyles of their
neighbors. 122 This dislike is further exacerbated by GCC
l21Norman Friedman, Desert Victory
,
(Annapolis, Maryland:
Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 11:
Modern Iraq has a Shi ' ite majority (currently about
55 percent of the population) living in the southern half
of the country, down to the Iranian and Saudi borders, and
a large Kurdish minority (about 20 percent) in the north
(including the oil area around Mosul and Kirkuk) . To the
extent that Iraqis have a national identity, it is
probably concentrated in the Arab Sunni Muslims living
around the Euphrates River.... The country is ruled by the
Sunni minority. However, as the Iran-Iraq War showed, the
Shi'ites consider themselves distinct from their religious
(but not ethnic) brethren in Iran.
122 Iran and Iraq taken together comprise between 75 and 80
percent (depending on which census data is used) of the total
population of the nations under consideration.
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support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, and by GCC support
of U.S. forces during the Gulf War.
Islamic fundamentalism must be an underlying factor in any
attempt to discern plausible scenarios for the region. Iran,
for the moment, appears to be drawing back from its embrace of
Islamic fundamentalism. The threat of a renewed period of
fundamentalism, however, is not too far beneath the surface of
everyday life in the region. The Iranians, being non-Arab, are
viewed as the threat in the Gulf region today by the GCC
Arabs
.
U.S. influence in the Gulf region is a significant
consideration in the development of the following scenarios.
This is due to the importance that the United States so
obviously places on the region. The United States has made it
clear that the Gulf region is of vital interest, and as such
it will seek to maintain considerable military and political
influence there. The scenarios presented will consider the
impact that U.S. influence, both military and political, can
have in this region, a region whose entire past has been
marked by volatility. Consistent with the previously stated
goal of employing sound policy to shape the strategic
environment (with the ultimate aim of the United States
achieving its regional objectives without having to resort to
combat operations) , it is imperative that the United States
seek to maintain as much political and military sway in the
region as possible. Should a crisis, for whatever reason,
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flare up, the United States must take those steps that are
deemed necessary to solve the problem on terms favorable to
its long-range interests. If the environment has been
successfully shaped by U.S. policy in the region, one could
reasonably expect that the solution to a crisis lies somewhere
short of the need to intervene militarily.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are adapted and updated from Defending
Arabia . This 1986 book by John E. Peterson examined Gulf-
specific security issues as well as the greater Middle East
conflict (Arab-Israeli) . The tables have been adapted by the
author to reflect the end of Cold War tensions between the
United States and former USSR. Additionally, the focus of the
tables has been narrowed to the nations actually bordering the
Persian Gulf littoral, while to the greatest extent feasible
excluding Arab-Israeli issues. 123
123John E. Peterson, Defending Arabia , (New York: St
Martin's Press, 1986), p. 118 and p. 121.
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Table 4.1: U.S. Interests in the Gulf in the 1990s
Strategic interests
I. Guarantee continued access to Gulf oil.
II. Promote stability in the Gulf region
Tactical objectives
1. Maintain the capability for military intervention in
the Gulf through:
a. Maintaining a viable military force for use in the
Gulf
b. Continuing naval deployments in the Gulf and
northern Arabian Sea.
c. Increasing efforts to gain contingency access to
regional military facilities.
2. Deter military attack by regional powers through:
a. Stressing U.S. resolve to defend the region
through the use of military force, if necessary
b. Preventing Iran from achieving regional hegemony
c. Continuing U.N. sanctions on Iraq until the
Baathist regime is replaced by one more friendly
to the West.
d. Ensuring through arms sales to friendly Gulf
states that imbalances of power do not tempt
aggressor nations into preemptive attacks
3
.
Support the status quo in friendly states in the
region through:
a. Continuing supportive relationship with Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) , including:
i. Strong economic ties
ii. U.S. participation in GCC development efforts
iii . Continued cooperation on policies regarding
the Middle East, particularly the Arab-Israeli
conflict
b. Expanding military relationship with GCC states,
including:
i. Enhanced U.S. military presence in the region
ii. Regularly scheduled U.S. /GCC joint military
exercises
iii . Increased military to military contacts, port
visits, officer exchange programs, pre-
positioning of materiel, etc.
iv. Opening preliminary discussions regarding the
possible establishment a formal military
alliance between the U.S. and GCC states
4. Promote stability in the region through:
a. Continuing efforts for a peaceful solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
b. Providing a counter-weight to increased Iranian or
Iraqi hegemonic aspirations by providing high-
profile security assistance to GCC states
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Table 4.2: Threats to Gulf Security
I. Regional threats (arising from the interaction of two or
more Gulf states)
A. Armed conflict:
1. Border tensions and clashes
2. Full-scale war
B. Subversion directed by one state against another or
others
:
1. Radical Islamic movements
2. Poor versus rich movements
3. Pan-Arab socialist movements
4. Conservative/tribal opposition




3. Ethnic irredentist/separatist movements (e.g.
Kurds or Baluch)
4. Iran-GCC tensions
II. Internal threats (arising from factors within a single
Gulf state)
A. Replacement of existing governments:
1. Change of government within existing ruling family
or power holding elite
2
.
Coup by secular left
3. Coup by Islamic radicals
B. Opposition to existing governments (deterioration of
authority)
:
1. Tensions due to political repression
2. Isolated attacks on government (sabotage or
terrorism)
3. Insurrection (due to ethnic, sectarian or
ideological divisions)
4. Civil War or other absence of effective state
authority or control
C. Policy changes ' in existing governments (conflicting
with U.S. policy or interests):
1. Economic issues of oil pricing and production
levels
2. *Oil weapon' (the political use of oil supplies to
influence or change U.S. policy)
III. United States policies:
A. Unilateral military deployment to secure oil fields
(direct invasion)
B. Unilateral military action against a Gulf state or
states (similar to Iranian hostage rescue attempt)
C. Collaborative military action to restore status quo
(similar to Operation Desert Storm)
D. Collaborative economic actions (e.g. U.N.
import/export sanctions or investment restrictions)
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B. THE STATUS QUO SCENARIO
This scenario reflects a changing set of circumstances
which closely follow the current situation in the region and
projects it forward ten years into the future (2002) . In this
scenario, Iran continues to recover from the eight year war
with Iraq. Although not possessing formidable offensive
military power, Iran has the oil revenues and, more
importantly, the population to support an army capable of
regional power projection. Its regime less driven by rabid
Islamic fundamentalism, Iran continues to moderate its foreign
policies and moves closer to the political mainstream within
the region. Although Iran is no longer a political pariah
state, it is viewed with suspicion by the other Gulf states.
Iran's large and growing population, accelerating oil
revenues, and an expanding role in regional affairs have given
this nation a new perspective in Gulf affairs. Although the
bloody war with Iraq ended in 1988 and several alliance
initiatives have been made by Iraq, Iran continues to view
Iraq as a dangerous military and political power. After coming
to the conclusion that Iraq's quest for regional hegemony is
in conflict with its own designs, Iran finds itself once again
polarized as regards its neighbor to the west. After a series
of political confrontations which signal an unwillingness to
strengthen political ties, Iran and Iraq drift to opposite
ends of the political spectrum within the Gulf region.
80
At the root of Iran's motives is a strong desire to raise
its standard of living and to assume a leadership role in the
Gulf region. After a decade of political and economic
isolation, Iran finds itself in dire straits. Fanatical
Islamic fundamentalism in Iran discouraged Western investment
and political contacts. Iran's military has been unable to
purchase high technology weaponry from Western sources. Iran
was able to purchase considerable guantities of military
hardware from Russia and China, but this eguipment is
technically inferior to the advanced Western systems which the
GCC states have acguired. A key goal for Iran is to moderate
the radical Islamic fundamentalism, with an eye towards
attracting Western investment and eventually rearming its
military with state of the art Western weapon systems.
Two significant factors stand in the way of Iran achieving
these goals; Arab distrust and Iranian hard-line
fundamentalists. Iraq views the situation as a zero sum game.
Since Iran has openly declared it has no desire to enter into
any type of alliance with Iraq, the Iraqi leadership believes
that any gains made by Iran would be at the expense Iraq. Iraq
will use any means available, perhaps only short of an all-out
war, to deny a further Iranian military build-up and an
accompanying increase in its regional influence. The
persistent hard-line policies of Iran's religious clerics is
the second factor which interferes with the political
leadership's goals of increased political and military
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leverage in regional affairs. Although the clerics no longer
wield the near-absolute power they enjoyed during the reign of
Ayatollah Khomeni, they nonetheless exert considerable
influence within the government and society. The "religious
right" vehemently opposes ties with Western governments.
Dealings with the "Great Satan" (the U.S.) are still anathema
to the religious leaders. Since the United States continues to
wield considerable political and military influence within the
region, while at the same time possessing the capital and
military hardware which Iran needs to rebuild its armed
forces, the issue of Islamic fundamentalism is taken seriously
by both Washington and Tehran.
The differences between the moderate and fundamentalist
factions are a source of continuous internal turmoil in Iran.
Would-be successors to Ayotallah Khomeni have effectively
handcuffed the moderate government. The religious leaders'
inflexible position on Western investment and assistance
continues to discourage outsiders from offering a helping hand
to Iran. Although modest amounts of Japanese and European
capital have been invested in Iran, it has had little effect
on the nation's macro-economic health. Religious leaders and
government officials continue to disagree on both external and
internal political goals. As a conseguence Iran continues to
vacillate between progressive/pragmatic policies and the
isolation brought about by embracing radical fundamentalism.
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Iraq, on the other hand, continues to rebuild after a
crippling defeat in the Persian Gulf War. Although Saddam
Hussein has been able to maintain power, the political costs
have been staggering. Iraq continues to be hampered by the
effects of many of the peace treaty conditions which were
imposed on it at the end of the war. Oil production has
increased only slowly, far below that of all the other oil
producing states in the Gulf region. Iraq has been
consistently delinquent in making the U.N. mandated payments
of war reparations to the Kuwaiti government. Saddam Hussein
remains a political pariah. He has lost the support of several
key allies in the region.
The Iraqi internal power base is maintained by brutally
suppressing all opposition groups. Although Saddam has been
able to maintain a grip on political power, it has not been
without costs. Military leaders have been purged in
Stalinesque fashion. Top government officials who have
advocated softening hard-line political positions have been
publicly executed. Various coalition elements have
unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the Baathist regime,
with horrific results for the coup plotters and their
sympathizers. Ethnic minorities continue to be brutalized as
a matter of national policy. For the foreseeable future, there
appear to be no groups or individuals with sufficient
resources to threaten Saddam's grasp on power.
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The Iraqi army remains a powerful force. However, they
have been unable to rebuild to pre-war levels. Although they
have been unable to buy sophisticated Western military
equipment, they have been able to buy vast quantities of
Russian and Chinese military equipment. This equipment,
combined with Iraq's indigenously produced weapons, is slowly
bringing Iraq's armed forces to a level where they could once
again threaten their neighbors. Iraq's production of weapons
of mass destruction, including a resurrected effort to build
a nuclear weapon, remains a significant concern. Although
post-war agreements stripped Saddam of most of his weapons, he
was able to hide or rebuild many of his production facilities.
His ability to acquire ballistic missiles and the technology
to produce them has been a source of continued frustration to
both the United States and the GCC states.
Kuwait continues to rebuild both its government and its
petroleum industry. Although Kuwait has purchased sizeable
quantities of military hardware and has restructured its armed
forces, many of the lessons of Operation Desert Storm appear
to have gone unlearned. The government continues to pay lip
service to democratic reforms, while taking precious few
meaningful steps towards achieving a truly democratic state.
The majority of the labor force is imported from the third
world nations of Asia and Africa. The threat of an Iraqi re-
invasion continues to mount slowly. Kuwaiti efforts to oppose
Iraqi aggression are meager at best.
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The most significant political issue not directly related
to the Gulf states is the Middle East peace initiative.
Although the results have been largely insignificant thus far,
they have signalled a willingness to communicate. The Israeli
position has hardened. Offers to trade land for peace in the
Golan Heights and the West Bank have been withdrawn after Arab
negotiators attached conditions which were unacceptable from
the Israeli negotiators' perspective. The Palestinians
continue to generate world sympathy for their plight. Although
the majority of Gulf states would prefer to see the
Palestinians achieve self-rule, they realize that a compromise
solution which legitimizes the Palestinian's claims, while
leaving the door open for further negotiations, may offer
their best hope for an eventual negotiated settlement. Iraq
continues to oppose the peace initiatives and has attempted to
subvert the process. A return to Israeli/Arab hostilities
would significantly benefit Saddam Hussein by resurrecting
Pan-Arabic sentiments in the region.
The region's root of power, petroleum production,
continues to be a source of friction between Iraq, Iran, and
the GCC states. Iraqi oil production continues to climb,
however it remains far below pre-war levels. More importantly,
Iraq continues to push for lower production quotas in order to
increase the price of oil. Iranian production has increased to
near maximum levels. Combined with the heavy Saudi and Kuwaiti
production, an overabundance of supply has kept oil prices
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below pre-war levels. Low oil revenues have negatively
impacted Iraq's ability to rebuild its damaged infrastructure
and pay war reparations to Kuwait. Disputes over oil
production and pricing have been the most destabilizing
factors in the region.
The failure of Iran and Iraq to combine their efforts and
work towards a unified political and military effort has left
a marked impression on the region. Since neither has been able
to exert significant military leverage, the GCC continues as
a rather loose alliance. The lack of an overarching threat
fails to ignite tight military cohesion within the GCC. Of the
GCC states, Saudi Arabia maintains the largest and most
technologically advanced military. Acquisition of high
technology American hardware has significantly contributed to
Saudi' s military power. Although Saudi Arabia lacks the
population base to field a large standing military, its high
technology weapons systems have somewhat mitigated this
perceived shortcoming. As long as oil revenues remain stable,
the Saudi government should be able to maintain internal
political stability.
The remainder of the GCC states continue to modernize
their forces. However, their small populations preclude them
from being a threat to anyone except each other. They have
been able exert only a minor political influence in the
region. The GCC states realize that the weakness of Iran and
Iraq increase their relative safety margins. Saudi military
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modernization and a continued U.S. presence in the region
further contributes to the maintenance of regional security.
The United Nations will continue to monitor the weapons
production capability of Iraq through the turn of the century.
Periodic inspections by United Nations teams occur to ensure
that Iraq is not attempting to rebuild its nuclear, chemical,
and/or biological weapons production capability. Because
Saddam Hussein has remained in power, the international
community harbors a basic mistrust of Iraqi intentions. There
is widespread concern that Saddam will use any weapon of mass
destruction that he can get control of against one or more of
the countries which opposed him in the Gulf War of 1991. In
the eight year war with Iran, as well as in attempts to quell
his own restive minority groups, Saddam showed no compunction
in employing chemical weapons.
Iraq also has internal ethnic tensions and civil disorder
that continue into the twenty-first century. In northern Iraq
the Kurdish uprising is still a thorn in Saddam's side.
Operation Provide Comfort, which the coalition mounted to
protect the Kurds that fled northward at the end of the 1991
war, has not been formally terminated. U.S., French, and
British aircraft still conduct patrols over Iraq north of the
36 th parallel as a reminder to Saddam Hussein that further
genocide directed against the Kurdish population will not be
tolerated. The Kurdish rebels are still pressing for an
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independent and autonomous Kurdistan in the northern Euphrates
valley.
In southern Iraq, Shi ' ite rebels continue to foment
revolution against the Baathist regime. The Shi ' ites are being
supplied with weapons, soldiers, and food from fundamentalist
forces within Iran. Iranian support for the Shia uprising in
southern Iraq contributes significantly to the high level of
diplomatic tension between Baghdad and Teheran. Although
Operation Southern Watch 124 was officially terminated in early
1994, the United States and its allies have made it clear to
Baghdad that it could be rapidly reconstituted if the Iraqi
Air Force resumed attacks on the Shi 'ites. This implied threat
has, thus far, successfully deterred Saddam from resuming
offensive airstrikes directed against Shi 'ites in the south of
Iraq. In short, continued ethnic unrest threatens Saddam's
grip on power in Iraq.
To help maintain stability in the region and to deter any
aggressive actions by either Iran or Iraq, the United States
has maintained a significant naval presence in the Persian
Gulf littoral. The standard U.S. naval presence in the Gulf
has consisted of at least five warships and one nuclear attack
submarine. Of the surface ships, at least two are advanced
l24The U.S. led operation which in September 1992 created
a no-fly zone in Iraq south of the 32 nd parallel. This
operation prevented Iraqi aircraft from making strikes on
Shi 'ite positions in the southern marshes of that country.
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Aegis cruisers. One of the Aegis cruisers is configured for
anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) area defense. 123 The
other is a conventionally configured CG-47, capable of
defending against tactical aviation and cruise missile
threats. The Gulf surface action group (GULFSAG) also includes
at least one DDG-51 class destroyer with enhanced shallow
water ASW capability. The presence of the SSN is intended
primarily to deter Iranian Kilo-class diesel submarines from
conducting offensive operations.
An aircraft carrier makes at least one trip into the Gulf
every six months, or more frequently and in greater numbers if
the tactical situation dictates. The GULFSAG provides direct
support for the carrier when one forays into the Gulf. If
tensions in the region are determined to be low to normal, the
remainder of the carrier battle group (CVBG) stays in the
North Arabian Sea and remains less than one day steaming time
from any scene of action in the Gulf should their presence be
required. In periods of heightened tensions, the entire CVBG
transits into the Gulf 'in defensive formation. At least one
ATBM cruiser accompanies the battle group and provides area
defense against the possibility of a Silkworm missile attack.
The Strait of Hormuz must be sanitized of mines before the
125See: Robert Holzer and Barbara Opall, "Navy Looks for
Ship-Based Scud Interceptor," Navy Times , 14 Dec 92, p. 39.
This article examines U.S. Navy plans to deploy "ship-based
missile interceptor (s) best-suited to protect entire regions
from attack by Scud-type tactical ballistic missiles" at the
turn of the century.
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CVBG transits this chokepoint. Shipboard helicopter mine
countermeasures (MCM) are augmented by an MCM craft homeported
in Bahrain if it is determined likely that the Straits have
been mined. Pre-positioned materiel configured in unit sets
(POMCUS) is maintained aboard Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) in
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The nearest U.S. ground
forces are stationed in Western Europe and the nearest U.S.
air forces are stationed in Turkey. Saudi Arabian E-3A
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, with at
least one U.S. Air Force liaison officer aboard on each
operational mission, still provide the CINC, as well as all
data link capable combat units, a real-time air picture. A
plot of the real-time air/surface/subsurface picture is fused
and broadcast to all subscribers of the theater C 3 I network.
One of the lessons of Operations Desert Shield and Storm
was the importance of adequate lift in conducting military
operations in far flung locations. The U.S. Congress passed
legislation mandating that Defense Department increase funding
for, and emphasis on, this often neglected aspect of military
operations. As a result, by the turn of the century, the C-17
fleet is nearing completion and the United States is far less
reliant on foreign-flagged shipping to conduct military
operations in areas such as the Persian Gulf. The Military
Sealift Command acquired an additional 20 Fast Sealift Ships
(FSS) in the 1990s. These ships are capable of sustained
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speeds of 24 knots and greatly increased surge shipping
capability. 126 The lift problem, while not solved, has been
substantially reduced by 2002.
The GCC is beginning to assume a larger role in regional
security. The Saudis have taken the lead role in providing
Arabian Peninsula air defenses. The GCC has purchased and
deployed upgraded Patriot missile batteries from the United
States. Furthermore, they are negotiating, albeit very
tentatively, with Israel to acguire the Arrotv missile defense
system. The GCC states continue to display reluctance to
allowing any permanent basing of U.S. forces within their
territorial borders. However, substantial POMCUS in the GCC
nations somewhat alleviates this weakness in the combined
U.S. /GCC deterrence strategy. Additionally, regular military
and logistic exercises simulate reinforcing the GCC states in
wartime. In short, the United States and GCC should be well
positioned to repel a unilateral attack on the oilfields of
the peninsula by either Iran or Iraq.
l26See: Robert Holzer, "The Moving Man," Navy Times , 19
Oct 92. p. 36. This interview with Vice Admiral Michael
Kalleres, Commander, Military Sealift Command, addresses the
major challenges facing the MSC in the post-Cold War era. See
also: Eric Schmitt, "Huge Ships Are Carrying Supplies to the
Marines," New York Times , 7 Dec 92, p.A-7.
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C. THE IRAN-IRAQ COALITION SCENARIO
This scenario falls under the rubric of "worst case"
planning. It is based upon a possible Iran/Iraq coalition
arrayed against the nations of the GCC. For the purposes of
this scenario, it is assumed that a precondition for any
Iran/Iraq coalition would have to be a fall from power of the
Baathist regime in Baghdad. Certain conditions could
conceivably lead to the fall of the Iraqi Baathist government.
A Kurdish/ Shi ' ite coalition with Iranian support could
possibly overthrow and replace the government of Saddam
Hussein. A Kurdish condition for this temporary alliance might
be the eventual recognition by Iran of an independent
Kurdistan in northern Iraq. In an attempt to win Kurdish
support, the Iraqi Shi ites might be willing to abdicate all
claims to territory north of the 36 th parallel. In return,
Kurdish rebels would agree to support the Iraqi Shi ' ites in
their struggle to overthrow the government of Saddam and his
Baathist party. Iran, in this scenario, contributes weapons,
financial support, soldiers, and military advice to the Iraqi
Shi ' ite cause in order to promote Shi 'ite fundamentalism in
the region.
This scenario envisions that the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) , formerly an elite and extremely loyal military
entity, would be weakened by purges initiated by Baathist
leadership. Several unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the
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central government, engineered by high-ranking IRGC officers,
induced extreme paranoia in the leadership of the Baathist
regime. They tarred the IRGC with an excessively broad brush.
In their attempts to stem another attempt at a military coup
d'etat, they alienated the rank and file of the IRGC.
The Kurd/Shi' ite coalition with Iranian support would
successfully overthrow the Iraqi Baathist regime. As the
Baghdad government was overthrown, Saddam Hussein would be
deposed. A fundamentalist Shi ' ite party would establish a
replacement government in Iraq. After the demise of the
Baathist regime, it is assumed that Iraqi Sunni Muslims would
not be persecuted because of their Islamic cultural heritage.
Arab-Persian ethnic difficulties persist, but the autocratic
clerics in Baghdad are able suppress overt ethnic tension with
pleas invoking the primacy of rebuilding the nation of Iraq.
The clerical leadership in Baghdad has established a strong
and faithful national police corps to ensure that the populace
adheres to their government by decree. Subsequently, Islamic
fundamentalist sympathies in both Iran and Iraq allow
nationalistic antagonisms between these two nations to be
overcome
.
More recent differences, such as the defection of Iraqi
combat aircraft during the 1991 Gulf War, are resolved by
mutual consent of the two nations. Iran donates the aircraft
in question to the newly formed Islamic League. This alliance,
consisting solely of Iran and Iraq, immediately begins to
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attempt to exert influence in the region. The Islamic League
makes harsh demands in the areas of foreign policy, oil
production and pricing policies, and internal religious
practices. In the area of foreign policy it attempts to
pressure Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Bahrain,
to sever ties with the West. Particularly severe pressure is
directed towards Saudi Arabia. The Islamic League has
threatened a Jihad against the Saudis if they do not
capitulate to League demands. The Saudi royal family,
embroiled in an internecine battle over who will succeed the
terminally-ill King Fahd, fails to present a unified response
to the League. Specific demands of the Islamic League include:
The destruction of all pre-positioned American
military equipment on the Arabian Peninsula
An immediate and total pull-out of the American
military presence in Bahrain
An immediate discontinuance of all joint U.S./GCC
military exercises
The establishment of a system of charging user
fees for all maritime traffic entering the Persian
Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz : a move which would
constitute a clear violation of the concept of
freedom of the seas.
In the area of oil production, the Islamic League begins
to produce the maximum amount of oil possible while
simultaneously demanding that GCC states drastically reduce
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oil production. The GCC states fail to show firm resolve in
the matter of oil production, instead calling for a negotiated
settlement. These demands, coupled with a lack of resolve
displayed on the part of the GCC states, cause chaos in world
financial markets as speculators drive the price of petroleum
skyward on the spot market. The United States and European
Community (EC) have been engaging in a trade war (sparked by
the issue of farm subsidies)
,
and are unable to present a
unified and coherent Western response to League oil production
demands. Global oil shortages become increasingly common.
Internal religious behavior is also the subject of League
demands. The League demands complete control over all holy
sites in the Gulf region. Only this, the League argues, will
ensure that the holy sites remain pure in the eyes of Allah.
To establish League control of the holy sites of Mecca and
Medina, Iran and Iraq demand that League troops be granted
access to, and allowed to establish garrisons in, the
territory of Saudi Arabia.
The Turkish government, weakened by years of
unsuccessfully attempting to put down an insurrection by the
Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) , has overextended its military
and alienated large segments of its population. In response to
Islamic League demands, Turkey exerts pressure on the West in
two ways. First, the Turks deny the use of their airfields for
most U.S. military flights. Although U.S. and NATO aircraft
are still allowed to take off and land on a limited basis, any
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military aircraft which is armed is denied clearance.
Secondly, NATO troops stationed on Turkish soil are severely
harassed by the local populace. Western soldiers and airmen
are jeered and frequently the victims of assault when they
dare to venture outside of military bases. The government in
Ankara has made half-hearted efforts to reign in the restive
Turkish population but has had little success.
In the early 1990s three tactical nuclear weapons
mysteriously disappeared during transport from Kazakhstan to
Russia. Additionally, while Western efforts to employ high
level nuclear scientists left jobless after the collapse of
the Soviet Union were generally considered successful, lower
level Russian assembly and manufacturing technicians were
unemployed and actively sought jobs abroad. Reliable sources
in the Saudi Arabian delegation in Washington allege that at
least twenty of these technicians have hired on with the
Islamic League, enticed by generous salaries and subsidized
housing. In response to Western inquiries concerning their
nuclear weapons programs, both Iran and Iraq issued publicly
stated policies resembling the United States 1 "neither confirm
nor deny" (NCND) policy. Additionally, the Islamic League has
refused to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
to inspect sites suspected of being nuclear weapons
facilities.
The newly formed Islamic League has attempted to establish
regional hegemony via four broad areas of influence. The areas
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include political/diplomatic leverage, military power,
economics, and ideology. All four "pillars of power" are being
used in varying degrees in an attempt to establish Iran/Iraq
dominance in the Gulf region.
Political/Diplomatic - In this area, the League is pursuing
its goal of domination of the Gulf region by attempting to
exert diplomatic and economic pressure within OPEC to control
the price of oil. The League is attempting to drive oil prices
up to increase revenues from their production and to harm
Western nations which remain reliant on oil exports from the
region. Additional actions in this area would be to attempt to
change the orientation of the GCC from a reliance on
cooperation with the Western powers towards a more inwardly
focused, regional orientation. Islamic League provocateurs
have infiltrated Saudi Arabia with instructions to inflame
popular discontent and attempt to foment revolution against
the ruling family's regime. Although League provocateurs have,
thus far, had very limited success in inciting large-scale
rebellions, the Saudi government is taking this threat to
national stability seriously. In response, the Saudi military
has devoted a significant portion of its budget to counter-
insurgency operations. Iran and Iraq have also extended
invitations to all other Gulf states to join the Islamic
League. The intent of the League leadership is the ultimate
disestablishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council with,
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eventually, all Gulf States allied against the West under the
Islamic League banner.
Military - The Islamic League's strongest area of influence
lies in the sphere of its military power. It has accelerated
the naval build-up in the Persian Gulf in an attempt to
control this vital waterway. The League has discovered that
the nations of the former Soviet Union are willing to sell any
combat system in their national inventories, as well as
providing operator training, on either a cash or barter (for
oil) basis. Additionally, the People's Republic of China and
North Korea have expressed a willingness to sell advanced
military equipment to the League in return for hard currency.
In an effort to reduce their reliance on third-party
suppliers, the League would also undertake to indigenously co-
produce ships and armaments as the two nations pursue their
goal of regional hegemony. The possession of nuclear weapons
by the League further strengthens their military capability.
The League might target Kuwait City and Riyadh in an attempt
to use the threat of punishment to achieve its objectives.
Should these efforts prove insufficient, a two-pronged
offensive could be launched to consolidate control of the
region's oil resources. The attack would originate from both
the north and the south. League forces would use Kuwait City
as a pivot point on the drive along the eastern shores of the
Arabian Peninsula. In the south League forces would launch
from Bandar Abbas across the Strait of Hormuz to occupy Oman,
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U.A.E., Qatar, and the southern half of the Arabian peninsula
(with the exception of Yemen) . Any remaining Saudi or Bahraim
forces would be crushed between the two advancing armies in a
pincer move.
Economics - The two Islamic League members do not possess any
considerable measure of economic power. Their ability to
establish hegemony over the region via economic means has been
quite limited. The League, after diplomatic pressure in OPEC
fails to increase oil prices, attempts to weaken the economies
of the GCC states by flooding the world oil market. This
action forces the GCC states to increase their output in order
to maintain revenues, because the price of oil drops in
response to the increased supply. The decrease in marginal
revenues associated with higher production levels convinces
the GCC states to go back to the pre-crisis output. The
resulting net decrease in revenues sends shock waves through
the domestic economies of the GCC states. Islamic League
strength is enhanced as they fan the discontent of GCC
populations and direct 'it against the royal families of the
affected GCC states.
Ideology - Ideology has become a more potent force than
nationalism in 2002. The power of an attractive ideology which
stresses fundamental Islamism is used by the Islamic League in
an attempt to attain its goal of regional hegemony. The League
encourages and actively supports those political parties which
are fundamentalist in orientation in the GCC states. League
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propaganda portrays the Saudi royal family as unfit guardians
and caretakers of the holy shrines in Mecca and Medina, while
proclaiming the itself as the rightful champion and protector
of Islamic tradition. In the GCC states, a combination ot
internal instabilities, disparity in living standards, and
demographic pressures, has caused large segments of the GCC
states' populations to view the ideological appeals propounded
by the Islamic League sympathetically.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
If either of the two scenarios outlined above were
actually to unfold, the effect on U.S. regional interests
would be widely dissimilar. In the Status Quo case, the U.S.
would probably be able to continue to protect its national
interests, albeit without exerting an overwhelming influence
in the region. The Iran-Iraq Coalition, which conceivably
could arise if the United States were to abdicate its roles as
guardian of regional stability, would severely threaten U.S.
regional interests. Table 4 . 3 on the following page contrasts
the major elements of each scenario.
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A far less likely future for the Gulf is one in which
regional peace and harmony is seen as an achievable goal. A
third plausible future outcome is one in which frictions
between Iraq and Iran increase, resulting in a regional
stalemate. In the event that any possible coalition between
the two largest military powers in the region is effectively
nil, the United States and the GCC states could conceivably
capitalize on the Iran/Iraq stalemate and seek to effect an
enduring peace in the region.
If the U. N . -sponsored economic embargo of Iraq were to be
kept in place for many years, it is possible that a desperate
Iraqi public would eventually succeed in removing Saddam
Hussein from power. Given the security apparatus Saddam has in
place, this outcome would only be possible by unconventional
means (e.g. a military coup d'etat or an assassination) If the
Baathist regime were replaced by a centrist-oriented faction,
it is possible that this new Iraqi government would, out of
economic necessity, be more responsive to Western and GCC
demands for greater regional stability.
A vaguely worded promise to loosen the economic sanctions,
on the condition that the new Iraqi government capitulated to
the most pressing Western and GCC demands and altered their
national behavior to comply with widely recognized norms and
conventions, could be offered as an incentive. However, the
U.N. would have to make any relaxation of sanctions also
contingent upon Iraq making regularly scheduled payments of
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war reparations to Kuwait. International pressure could be put
on the new Iraqi government to abide by the letter and spirit
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iraq would still feel a
pressing need to maintain conventional forces sufficient for
defense of its borders, but the nation's primary efforts could
be redirected towards rebuilding its war torn economy.
At the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
1995 extension conference, the United States and its allies
should propose changes which increase the technical obstacles
to make undetected acquisition of nuclear weapons more
difficult, and to decrease the political incentives for
acquiring nuclear weapons. These measures should include:
information sharing between intelligence agencies and the
IAEA; a new amendment by the United States to its Foreign
Assistance Act that prohibits U.S. aid for any nation that
does not sign the NPT; all signatories of the NPT pledge the
non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states
(NNWS) ; multilateral arms reduction talks occur between all
NWS; and the requirement the U.N. sponsored sanctions be
enforced against nations which violate the NPT.
If outside powers, with the United States in the lead,
could somehow convince the nations of the Gulf that massive
expenditures for offensive armaments contribute to regional
instability (with the additional disadvantage of serving to
deplete national treasuries) , a dramatic change could be
effected in regional relations. The United States could
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continue to sell arms to the nations of the region, but it
must emphasize the defensive nature of those weapon systems
that are sold. This is not a new challenge for the United
States. Israeli objections to U.S. high technology arms sales
to Saudi Arabia (particularly the E-3 AWACS) were overcome, in
part, by stressing the defensive nature of the systems.
Additionally, the United States could attach conditions to
weapons sales to ensure that the weapons are not used in an
offensive manner. 127
The long-term goal of U.S. policy must be to replace
offensive military power with economic might as the defining
symbol of national prestige in the Gulf region. This will be
a herculean task, given the region's long and violent history.
The task is further complicated by the seeming contradiction
of recent U.S. arms sales to its friends in the region. If,
however, if U.S. leaders and diplomats are able to
successfully communicate to regional actors that these arms
sales were intended to shore up the regional balance of power
and are strictly defensive in nature, U.S. arms sales could be
cast in a different, less threatening light.
l27Several methods (e.g. making spare parts, ammunition,
training, maintenance support, etc., contingent upon the
buyer- nation not using the American-supplied systems in an
offensive mode) are available to the United States to ensure
that it retains a modicum of control over the weapons that it
sells to its clients. In post-Shah Iran, for example, the
cutoff of U.S. materiel support led to several high technology
weapons systems (F-14 fighters, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft,
etc.) falling into such a state of disrepair that they became
virtually incapable of mounting offensive operations.
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In concert with supporting regional economic development,
the United States and its allies should gently push for an
eventual increase in democratization throughout the region. It
is hoped that Western efforts to induce similar changes in
perceptions of national power in the states of the former
Soviet Union can provide a framework for a similar policy in
the Gulf.
The United States should continue to press for further
implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) . Diplomatic efforts designed to persuade the other
major suppliers of high technology weapons to the Gulf region
(Russia, China, North Korea, U.K., France, etc.) should be
given renewed emphasis at the State Department and the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) . Another arms control
initiative, the U.N. proposal to track conventional arms
transfers worldwide, with the stated aim of rendering the
international arms market transparent, should receive
continued U.S. support, as well as financial and operational
assistance.
The possibility of Russian nuclear expertise proliferating
to the Gulf region could have profound implications for U.S.
national security. It is in the United States' national
interest to ensure that ex-Soviet nuclear weapons scientists
and technicians are not allowed to sell their expertise to the
highest bidder in the international arms market. An
international free enterprise consortium should set up an
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institute for peaceful research in Russia. This institute
could give unemployed nuclear scientists and technicians an
opportunity to do meaningful research. These institutes would
be commissioned to seek solutions to the most vexing
scientific problems of the day.
Similarly, the United States and its allies should seek to
aid the Russian arms industry as it converts to commercial
applications.. Financial aid should be augmented with
management expertise to smooth the painful transition from a
war economy towards a free market. The ultimate goal of the
United States should be to assist the former Soviet lands in
the transition to democratic governments and free market
economies
.
The measures outlined above seek to lower the flash point
in the Gulf, as well as in other unstable and highly
militarized regions in the world. Granted, none of the
measures will be simple to implement. However, as the post-
Cold War era progresses and an uncertain world order develops,
mechanisms must be put in place that seek to maintain regional
peace. The measures discussed above are all long-term in
nature. Many may have to be altered in light of unforeseen
expediencies. A two-pronged approach in American foreign
policy, a short- and a long-term strategy, would appear to
offer the best hope of protecting the nation's interests.
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E. CONCLUSIONS
Of the two main scenarios presented, the possibility of an
alliance between Iran and Iraq presents the greatest threat to
United States interests in the region. On the other hand, the
status quo scenario provides only limited security for U.S.
interests. Using these scenarios for reference, how should the
United States tailor its policies in the Persian Gulf region
in order to ensure that its vital interests are protected? The
vital U.S. national interest in this region is the maintenance
of an uninterrupted supply of oil to the industrialized
nations of the world. The following U.S. national objectives
are postulated to support this vital interest in the Gulf
region: deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction; deterrence of conventional
aggression directed against either United States forces or our
allies in the region, and; maintenance of pro-Western
sentiment among the GCC states. The long-range objective of
developing alternative energy sources is postulated in an
attempt to eventually reduce Western reliance on petroleum
products, thereby reducing the importance of the Gulf region
to the United States and its allies. As long as the price of
oil remains low, however, it is unlikely that any serious
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effort to develop alternative energy sources will be
undertaken. I28
Deterrence of the use of nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC)
weapons in the region requires several policy actions by the
United States. The purpose of these actions should be to
provide incentives through both reward and punishment for Gulf
states to abstain from developing or purchasing weapons of
mass destruction. On the diplomatic level, The United States
should take a proactive role in the 1995 extension meeting for
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The goal of this meeting
should be to provide political, economic, and military
incentives for nations to remain nuclear-free. Also on the
political level, the United States should make it clear
(either implicitly or explicitly, depending on the political
circumstances in the region at the time) that it will respond
with U.S. nuclear forces to any attempts to coerce or attack
the GCC states using weapons of mass destruction. 129 Thus, the
United States should extend its nuclear deterrence policy to
the GCC states. This policy shift will reduce the incentive
128See: Aarts and Renner, "Oil and the Gulf War," p. 29,
note 12.
On July 27, 1990, just before the takeover of
Kuwait, Iraq's intimidation tactics led OPEC to raise its
target price from $18 to $21 per barrel. U.S. Ambassador
April Glaspie reportedly told Saddam Hussein on July 25
that "We have many Americans who would like to see the
price (of oil per barrel) go above $25 because they come
from oil-producing states."
129A study of the likely effectiveness of such a
deterrence policy is recommended for further research.
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for the GCC states to develop nuclear arsenals of their own,
and perhaps deter further nuclear development programs by Iran
and Iraq.
On the economic level, the United States should continue
to use its economic power in an attempt to slow or inhibit the
proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction
and their means of delivery. This can be done using existing
regimes such as the MTCR and the Australia Group (concerning
chemical weapons technology). Additionally, any U.S. or
Western aid or economic development funds could be made
contingent upon inspections to insure that recipient nations
are not involved in NBC programs. Furthermore, the United
States should use its not insignificant power base in
international economic organizations (IMF, GATT, G-7 , etc.) to
exert trade sanctions against potential proliferators and
their customers. 130
The military options to deter the use of weapons of mass
destruction could involve designating tactical nuclear-capable
military forces, which could be rapidly deployed to the Gulf
l3uSee: Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Plans to Appeal to Allies
to Broaden Ban on Arms Sales to Iran," New York Times , 18 Nov
92, p. A-7 . This article describes preliminary discussions in
which the United States is trying to persuade the other six G-
7 nations to halt sales of all militarily useful equipment to
Iran. The initial results are far from encouraging:
...the Bush Administration has already met considerable
resistance from its allies, who are eager to increase
trade with Iran. In addition, the United States has
pressed for the plan at such a low level that none of the
allies have taken it seriously.
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region or any other trouble spot, for the purposes of
threatening retaliation or punishment to any potential
aggressor. Another possible U.S. military option would involve
taking preemptive action to destroy weapons manufacturing
capabilities prior to actual development of the weapons.
Whether a U.S. president would authorize a preemptive strike,
such as the bombing raid carried out by Israel in 1981 which
destroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor outside Baghdad 131
,
is
open to question. The instantaneous nature of modern
communications technology (the "CNN effect") could serve to
deter a president from pursuing the preemption option.
Nonetheless, the national objective of regional nuclear
deterrence will only be realized if the United States takes
forceful and credible steps at the political, economic, and
military levels.
Deterrence of conventional aggression against our allies
in the Gulf region also requires a multi-faceted approach by
the United States. In order to deter potential adversaries to
the GCC states, the United States must demonstrate its
commitment to the region. Fortunately, the 1991 Gulf War is a
recent and striking example of U.S. resolve and should provide
the United States with a measure of credibility for some time.
Even so, the United States should ensure that there is no
doubt about its commitment to stability in the region. This
'-"Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge,
Ma.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), p. 207.
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can only be done by formalizing a comprehensive security
treaty with the GCC, increasing the levels of permanently pre-
positioned U.S. military equipment in GCC states, and
increasing the number of joint and combined military exercises
involving U.S. troops on GCC territory. 132
On the political and economic levels, by reducing the
proliferation of NBC arms technology and ensuring that U.S.
allies in the region are adequately armed (with conventional
weapons) to fend off would-be regional aggressors, the
likelihood of conflict can be decreased. Also on the political
level, the United States should actively seek to ensure that
no political/military alliance or coalition is allowed to
develop between Iran and Iraq. U.S. efforts to topple Saddam
Hussein from power should continue to be tempered with the
knowledge that if Iraq disintegrates, a de facto coalition
could develop between the Iraqi Shi'ites and Tehran.
On the military level, a number of factors are key to
ensuring the long-term deterrence of hostilities in the
region. First, allocating significant intelligence assets to
the region should provide increased warning time to ensure
timely U.S. military force deployments. Such a strong signal
of U.S. resolve may deter military aggression directed at our
allies, or lead to termination of a conflict prior to
132Such policies are currently being pursued by USCINCCENT
according to RADM P.D. Smith, U.S.N. , J-5, USCINCCENT, in a
briefing at the Naval Forward Presence Conference in
Cambridge, Ma. on 18 Nov 92.
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escalation into all-out war. Second, an increased U.S. naval
presence in the waters of the Persian Gulf along with a
permanent Army and Air Force presence on GCC soil 133
,
will
strengthen deterrence and provide the United States with
immediate crisis response capability. The national objective
of conventional deterrence is primarily met by using U.S.
military might backed up by political alliances and
declaratory policy. However, the use of economic power cannot
be discounted. Economic influence can be a powerful shaping
tool in the Gulf region.
Maintenance of pro-Western sentiment among the GCC states
relies primarily on the progress of the Arab-Israeli peace
process, and the effect of Islamic fundamentalism on the
moderate Arabs. The United States should continue to use its
political, economic, and military influence on both Israel and
the Arab states to ensure that the peace process achieves the
greatest possible success. The United States would probably be
133The author realizes that the issue of basing U.S.
forces on GCC soil is a politically difficult one for both the
United States and the GCC states. Domestic economic concerns
further complicate the subject. However, as the requirement
for U.S. forward presence to contain the former Soviet Union
and its Warsaw Pact partners declines, it would make strategic
sense to redeploy a portion of these deterrent forces to
likely regional trouble spots. The Persian Gulf would
certainly seem to qualify as a potential trouble spot. If host
nation support arrangements cannot be worked out between the
United States and GCC, the option of focusing on
joint/combined exercises is a viable alternative to the
permanent basing of U.S. land and air forces in the theater of
operations. See also: John M. Collins, "U.S. Military Force
Reductions: Capabilities Versus Requirements," Washington,
Congressional Research Service RPT. No. 90-43 S, 8 Jan 92.
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wise not to attempt to influence the affairs of Arab religious
movements in too intrusive a manner. The lessons learned by
the U.S. experience with Iran provide ample justification for
this recommendation.
An additional national objective is the development of
alternative energy sources. As mentioned previously, U.S.
progress in this endeavor has, thus far, not yielded
significant results. This lack of progress, however, should
not be taken as a signal that future gains are impossible. The
United States must formulate a national energy policy which
substantially lessens its dependence on foreign sources of
energy. Instituting a modest 50 cent tax on each gallon of
gasoline sold in the United States, for example, could spur
serious research in the direction of developing alternative
fuels. 134 In the meantime, however, the fact remains that the
oil reserves in the Persian Gulf region makes its stability
vital to United States interests. At the same time the oil
fields of the Gulf region provide a tempting target to would-
be aggressors. Decreasing the reliance of the United States on
this resource would go a long way towards reducing U.S.
vulnerability to instability in the region.
134H. Ross Perot (independent candidate) advocated a
similar measure, to be phased-in over five years in ten cent
increments, in the 1992 presidential election campaign. While
Mr. Perot's motivation for the tax was to reduce the Federal
budget deficit, the fact that the proposal was taken seriously
(Perot garnered 19% of the popular vote) indicates that the
American public may be ready for such modest steps if they are
properly informed on the issues involved.
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In conclusion, the United States has before it a wide
range of regional policy options for the Gulf. Among the
possible outcomes of U.S. regional policy actions, or
inactions, is a conflict with a nuclear-armed Iran and Iraq.
This outcome appears eminently avoidable if the proper course
is followed at all levels of political, military, and
diplomatic policy.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Broadly stated, the goals of American policy in the
Persian Gulf should be to maintain regional peace and security
while at the same time ensuring the unrestricted flow of oil
through this strategic waterway. The recommended method for
achieving these goals is for the United States to attempt to
shape the strategic environment (via diplomatic, political,
and military means) into one which is sympathetic to American
interests. Several potential shaping strategies have already
been discussed in previous chapters.
The first chapter of this thesis put forth the case that
recent efforts by the United States to exert a steadying
influence in the region have fallen well short of the mark.
The 1991 Gulf War stands as testimony to a failed deterrence
strategy. Although coalition forces prevailed rather handily
in that war, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the war
could have been avoided had the United States pursued more
coherent policies (and sent unambiguous signals of U.S.
resolve when it became apparent that a failure of deterrence
was imminent) in the period leading up to the 2 August 1990
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Iraq. 135 One hopes that
135A.M. Rosenthal, "Clinton And the Mideast," New York
Times , 10 Nov 92, p. A-15: "Saddam Hussein showed that
appeasing dictators and encouraging or permitting their
military buildup creates the powder of war." See also: "Iran
Resurgent," New York Times , editorial, 16 Nov 92, p. A-12:
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American policy makers have learned from previous mistakes.
The recent history of the Gulf region provides numerous
examples of U.S. policy failures from which to glean valuable
lessons
.
As it is extremely likely that the United States will
continue to rely on the Gulf region for a large portion of its
energy resources, it is essential that the United States seek
to maintain influence in this region. In the past the U.S.
military has freguently acted in a fireman role, whether
putting out brushfires or fighting full-blown conflagrations.
It is the author's contention that in the future, if stability
is to be maintained and American interests protected, the
United States must assume a more proactive role in regional
affairs. Rather than simply responding to calls for help, the
United States must become more engaged (politically,
diplomatically, and militarily) and take the steps necessary
to avert crises before they develop. 136 In addition to
New revelations about how Western dual-use exports helped
Saddam Hussein turn Iraq into a dangerous military power
appear almost daily. It's important not to make the same
mistake in Iran.
136See: Leslie H. Gelb, "Putting U.S. First—Promises and
Pitfalls," New York Times , 17 Nov 92, p. A-19. In this article
Gelb argues that the Clinton administration must take a
proactive role in world and regional politics:
Clinton is more likely to fall prey to the... far more
insidious trap of passivity. World crises will occur no
matter what he does, but his chances of containing them
will improve if he is constantly trying to head them off.
It is not enough for the United States simply to be
engaged overseas; it must be engaged actively and
imaginatively, and with dollars. Otherwise, crises will
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attempting to nip potential crises in the bud, U.S. policy
must be geared toward controlling the potential for escalation
should a crisis situation, nonetheless, develop. This new role
for the United States would be patterned on a police officer
on a beat rather than on the fireman model.
The police officer model for U.S. presence in the Gulf is
not necessarily analogous to a constant carrier battle group
(CVBG) presence in the Gulf with land and air forces
permanently based ashore on the Arabian peninsula. Rather, it
seeks some form of continuous U.S. military presence in the
region with the potential to rapidly reinforce should the
strategic situation dictate. A standing GULFSAG, as described
in chapter three, might make a good starting point when
considering appropriate U.S. force levels for the Persian
Gulf.
The model for land and air forces would have to consider
anticipated levels of host nation support that military
planners could expect to be forthcoming. In view of this
planning problem, it would probably be in America's strategic
interest to establish a formal security relationship between
the GCC and the United States (and possibly other U.S.
allies) . The ad hoc coalition assembled for the 1991 war took
time to become effective—an unlikely luxury the next time
explode and devour Clinton's time and political
capital .... Iran and others will surely acguire nuclear
arms unless the United States mounts active opposition.
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another one is needed to reverse aggression. A formalized
collective security arrangement provides a more compelling
deterrent signal to potential aggressors than the vague threat
of possibly facing an ad hoc coalition of forces. One could
reasonably expect that the leadership of a dictatorial regime,
such as those found in Baghdad and Tehran, would probably
think long and hard before challenging any alliance to which
the United States has formally pledged its allegiance. The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides a framework for
successful deterrence. NATO doctrine states that an attack on
any NATO nation will be treated as an attack on the alliance
as a whole. Such a determined stance by the United States in
concert with the GCC states would significantly bolster
deterrence in the Gulf region.
Arguably, Iran poses the greatest potential threat to
Western interests in the Gulf in the post-Desert Storm period.
The focus of American policy must be to dissuade Iran from
further attempts to achieve regional hegemony. 137 This can be
137Recent reports indicate the United States is pursuing
just such a course of action. See: Steve Coll, "U.S. putting
up roadblocks in Iran's nuclear quest," Washington Post , 17
Nov 92:
Iran was on the verge earlier this year of obtaining
equipment from China and Argentina that would have allowed
it to begin its own nuclear manufacturing, but quiet
intervention by the United States has blocked transfers at
least for now, according to officials involved in the
negotiations. ... CIA director Robert Gates testified
earlier this year that Iran was seeking a nuclear bomb and
could have one by the year 2000 if the West does not
prevent it.
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pursued via several policy tracks. First, the United States
should continue seeking methods which limit Iran's access to
sophisticated weapon systems. This could prove problematic
given Russia's stated need for hard currency. Furthermore,
Chinese and North Korean intransigence in matters related to
arms control is well documented. Efforts to solve these
problems must be redoubled. The United States and its allies
hold several possible trump cards that have yet to be played.
Western economic aid to Russia could be suspended pending a
promise not to sell arms to Iran and other hostile powers. The
continuation of most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status could
be made contingent on obtaining a similar promise from
Beijing. 138 A number of methods could be adopted to increase
In response to these concerns, the United States has
stepped up satellite reconnaissance of Iran's nuclear-
related facilities, has passed on intelligence to
inspectors at the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy
Agency who visit Iran, and is attempting to monitor
Iranian nuclear procurement closely.
138See: Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Want to Buy the Bomb? No
Problem.," New York Times , 25 Nov 92, p. A-18. In this article
Timmerman advocates a tough U.S. stance towards Chinese arms
sales
:
China should be told firmly that continued exports
of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons technology to
the world's trouble spots will lead to trade sanctions and
a suspension of most-favored-nation status. Mr. Clinton's
statements last week indicate he may be softening his
stance on China. That would be a mistake. A tougher line
would cost the taxpayer nothing: we run a $13 billion
trade deficit with China, second only to our deficit with
Japan. It would also make the world safer.
Proliferation is the main security problem of the
1990' s. The new administration must address the issue
immediately, or there is a real risk that we will faced
with Desert Storm II and a half dozen more Iraqs before
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North Korea's isolation if it continues to supply arms to
outlaw states. These could include a United Nations Security
Council resolution restricting trade between the DPRK and
General Assembly nations if the Kim II Sung regime continues
on its present course regarding arms proliferation. It seems
unlikely that the Security Council would pass any resolution
of this sort, unless Russia and China were first co-opted into
a comprehensive arms control regime.
It is important that the United States not act
unilaterally in its pursuit of these policy goals. Even if the
notion of America as the sole remaining superpower is
accepted, it is doubtful that the United States possesses the
reguisite political and economic influence it would need if it
were to try to alter the course of international arms trade
unilaterally. The United Nations and existing security
alliances offer fora in which to air arms control proposals in
the joint interests of the United States and other states
interested in alleviating the dangerous arms buildup in the
Gulf region. A framework similar to the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) , which would encompass all
Persian Gulf nations, could be promoted by the U.S. delegate
to the U.N. Security Council.
If, however, despite concerted U.S. efforts to screen the
flow of dangerous weapons into the region, arms control
Bill Clinton's first term is up,
120
measures prove ineffective, the United States must be prepared
to take steps to ensure that the regional balance of power
does not shift in a manner which is inimical to its national
interests. Chapter two discussed using the tool of American
arms sales to GCC states in an attempt to offset and deter
regional powers which may have territorial ambitions which lie
beyond their present borders. This approach seeks to maintain
a regional correlation of forces which would deter any
potential aggressor by denying it the capability to attain its
war aims in the short- to medium-term. Also implicit in this
approach is the threat of inflicting unacceptable punishment
on any would-be aggressor should it nonetheless decide to
press a military offensive.
At first glance the two strategies discussed above, that
of seeking an enduring regional arms control regime and of
arming those states in the region which are friendly to U.S.
interests, might seem to be at odds with one another. In fact,
this is not the case. The goal of constructing a comprehensive
arms control regime for the region is a long-term one. While
the United States pursues this goal it must simultaneously
ensure that regional deterrence remains robust in the
intervening period. If the United States fails to protect its
short-term interests while seeking to achieve lofty long-range
policy goals, it runs the risk of allowing another deterrence
failure to occur, with possibly disastrous consequences. It is
important that a blend of pragmatic immediate policy be
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combined with the pursuit of more ambitious long-range policy
goals to ensure credibility in the short- to medium-term. A
clear separation of the two is reguired if the United States
is to maintain a credible regional deterrence posture. It is
essential that U.S. policy not lose focus on immediate
problems while striving to shape the future environment.
Simply put, past and current achievements cannot be sacrificed
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